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DOES IT COST TOO MUCH? A 'DIFFERENCE'
LOOK AT J.E.B. v. ALABAMA
Roberta K Flowers*
I tell you, it's queer, Mrs. Peters. We live close together, and we live
far apart. We all go through the same things-it's all just a different
kind of the same thing! If it weren't-why do you and I
understand?1
INTRODUCTION
A female defense attorney stares at the faces in front of her. These
Z individuals will decide her client's fate, a woman who shot her
husband seven times, including three times in the back. The attorney
must convince the jury that the defendant killed her husband because
she feared for her life and the life of her daughter.2 In asserting that
her client suffers from the battered woman syndrome, 3 the attorney
must make the jury understand the helplessness and fear the defend-
ant felt and why the defendant believed she had to kill her husband.
Each juror must view the defendant's life as a whole, not simply apply
an abstract principle of law. If the members of the jury cannot em-
pathize with the defendant, they cannot fairly evaluate her defense.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. I wish to
thank Professors Robert Batey, Becky Morgan, Tom Marks, Mike Finch, Pat Longan,
and Marleen O'Connor for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this
Article. A special thank you goes out to Loma Solomon, Whitney Glasser, and Julie
Walbroel for their assistance in researching and editing.
1. Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in Law and Literature: Legal Themes in
Short Stories 124, 137 (Elizabeth V. Gemmette ed., 1992).
2. This scenario is based on the case, Florida v. Soubielle, in the Circuit Court of
Seminole County, Florida. On April 22, 1988, Soubielle was convicted of second de-
gree murder with a firearm and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. See Diane Ma-
son, A Marriage Ends in Murder, St. Petersburg Times, May 26, 1991, at 1F, 6F-7F
(describing the facts of the case and reporting on the guilty verdict).
3. The battered woman syndrome was first defined by Lenore Walker in 1979.
Walker defines a battered woman as one who is subject to repeated physical or psy-
chological abuse "by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without any concern for her rights." Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman at xv(1979). The battered woman syndrome is a form of post-traumatic stress experienced
by battered women and is characterized by a feeling of helplessness, which causes the
battered woman to believe she cannot escape the three-phase cycle of violence often
observed in battering relationships. Lenore E. Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Bat-
tered Women Kill and How Society Responds 48-49 (1989). For a criticism of the use
of the battered woman syndrome as a defense to murder, see Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
4. One could imagine other scenarios involving cases that require the jury to
view facts in a broader context and not just apply abstract rules of law. The following
are two examples:
(a) A prosecuting attorney begins jury selection in a rape case. The defense asserts
that the victim, a young high school student, consented to sexual intercourse with the
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Attorneys have an ethical duty to zealously represent clients within
the bounds of the law.5 That duty includes determining which jurors
are most suitable for the case.6 Prior to voir dire,7 the attorney has
only general information about each juror, such as name, address, em-
ployment, prior jury service, and involvement in lawsuits. In addition,
the judge places constraints on the voir dire of the jury panel. After
briefly questioning the jury, the attorney must determine which jurors
will best understand the client's position. Armed with the knowledge
that men and women view the same information differently, the ex-
perienced trial attorney selects female or male jurors accordingly.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,8 held that litigants9 may not strike potential jurors solely on the
basis of gender.'0 The J.E.B. Court addressed the issue of gender-
defendant. The prosecuting attorney is concerned that not all potential jurors will
understand the victim's decisions. Unless the victim and her actions are viewed in
context, the defendant's actions may be deemed excusable.
(b) A plaintiff's attorney in a sexual harassment case faces an all-male jury. These
jurors will decide the legitimacy of the female plaintiff's claim. The attorney wonders
if any of them will understand the humiliation his client felt at the hands of her har-
asser. In all likelihood, none of these jurors has faced harassment and some may even
be guilty of such behavior. Regardless, the plaintiff's case is in their hands.
5. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[t]he duty
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law.... ." Model Code of Professional Responsibility
EC 7-1 (1980).
6. The attorney's duty is not to obtain an impartial jury, but to select jurors who
will understand his or her client's perspective. The adversarial system is founded on
the premise that truth is discovered by each side putting forth its version of the truth.
This idea is analogous to the jury selection process. By eliminating those jurors he or
she believes are partial to the other side, or are not in the best position to evaluate the
client's position, the attorney helps achieve the goal of seating a jury which can decide
the case fairly. Each juror need not be impartial; however, the goal sought is an im-
partial jury as a whole. See generally Gordon Bermant & John Shapard, The Voir Dire
Examination, Juror Challenges, and Adversary Advocacy, in The Trial Process No. 69
(Bruce D. Sales ed., 1981) (discussing several key issues presented by the voir dire
and juror challenge practices and advocating further empirical study of these issues to
improve the process of jury selection).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
8. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
9. Although J.E.B. dealt with the prosecutor's use of gender-based peremptory
challenges, the Court discussed litigants in general and did not tailor the discussion to
prosecutors in criminal cases. If precedent is any indication, J.E.B. will be extended
to criminal defendants and civil litigants. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348
(1992) (holding that the defendant's use of race-based peremptory challenges in crim-
inal trials violates the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate equal pro-
tection rights in a civil case).
10. This Article uses the term "gender" instead of "sex." There has been much
controversy over the use of these terms. Some scholars distinguish them by indicating
that sex refers to biological characteristics and gender refers to cultural distinctions.
Deborah L. Rhode, Theoretical Perspectives On Sexual Differences 3 (Yale Univ.
Press 1990). In Justice Scala's dissent in J.E.B., he states that it is a case of sex dis-
crimination because "[t]he present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised
on the basis of femininity or masculinity." 114 S. Ct. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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based peremptory challenges in the context of a criminal paternity
suit. The Court held that the use of gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under
Batson v. Kentucky."
Although the J.E.B. Court followed the reasoning of Batson and its
progeny, the decision was unwise because it failed to recognize the
differences between men and women and how these differences im-
pact the deliberation process. At a time when courts are attempting
to eliminate gender considerations in the jury selection process, the
differences in the sexes are being discovered in the fields of social sci-
ence and biology. 2 For example, the sciences have recognized that
women view a moral problem in the context of all the facts; men, on
the other hand, are more likely to view the dilemma based on abstract
principles.'" Also, women are inclined to view individual decisions in
light of the effect those decisions have on relationships.' 4 The attor-
ney, faced with jurors about which she has limited information, might
wish to have individuals who are more likely to judge a case in view of
the relationships of those involved. Scientific knowledge demon-
strates that those persons are more apt to be women.'5
A segment of the feminist movement has advocated for a recogni-
tion of the differences between men and women.16 The "difference"
feminists demand not that the differences between men and women
be ignored, but that they be valued. 7 The only way to value these
This Article, however, discusses the use of peremptory challenges based on the char-
acteristics which are "feminine" and "masculine," not merely the sex of the
individual.
11. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421 (referring to the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986)).
12. See infra part IV.A.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 238-51.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 238-51.
15. See infra part IV.A.
16. Among those feminists advocating a recognition of gender differences are
Robin West and Christine Littleton. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal.
L. Rev. 1279 (1987). Many feminists throughout the country, however, applauded the
Court's decision in J.E.B. as a step forward for the women's movement. The National
Women's Law Center characterized this ruling as a "'landmark decision for women's
rights' that recognizes 'the shared history of discrimination faced by women and racial
minorities in this country.'" David G. Savage, Supreme Court Bars Sex Bias in Jury
Selection, L.A. Tunes, Apr. 20, 1994, at Al, A19. "Women's groups praised the rul-
ing, saying that stereotypes have long kept women out of the jury box." Joan Bis-
kupic, Supreme Court 6-3, Prohibits Sex Bias in Jury Selection, Wash. Post, Apr. 20,
1994, at Al, A13. Deborah Ellis, the legal director of the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund in New York, said of the decision, the Court "has written a final
chapter to end discrimination against women in the jury system, and that's important
because there has been a lot of discrimination." Steve McGonigle, Court Rejects Gen-
der-Based Jury Selection" Women's Groups Hail Decision by Justices, Dallas Morning
News, Apr. 20, 1994, at 1A.
17. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Book Review, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 586 (reviewing
Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender (Harvard University Press 1989)) ("These differ-
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differences is to acknowledge their existence and allow their use in
decision making. To disregard these differences is to devalue them.
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor I8 stated in her concurring opinion,
the cost of J.E.B. is high.19
Race discrimination has been dealt with differently throughout his-
tory. The "strict scrutiny" test20 was specifically created in recognition
of the need to guard against race-based laws.2 Classifications based
on gender require a heightened scrutiny, however such classifications
are not inherently suspect and do not trigger the strict scrutiny test.'
In jury selection, the prohibition against the exclusion of individuals
based on race is founded on the rights of individual citizens. The
Court, when considering race-based peremptory challenges, has ele-
vated the juror's rights over those of the litigants. Elevation of black
jurors' rights makes sense in light of the unique role race has played in
this country's history,13 and given that African-Americans were previ-
ously refused the opportunity to serve on a jury. In contrast, the
Court has historically prohibited the exclusion of women from juries
based on a different justification-a recognition that women bring a
different perspective to the jury. The constitutional history empha-
sizes the difference that gender makes in the selection of jurors.34 Un-
ence feminists, as Rhode calls them, have exhorted the public to favor women's val-
ues, women's styles, and women's biological functions .... "); see also West, supra
note 16, at 18 ("Cultural feminists, to their credit, have reidentified these differences
as women's strengths, rather than women's weaknesses.").
18. Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the prosecution had failed to
provide an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for its gender-based peremptory
challenges, as required by Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982). J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in
Hogan which held that Mississippi's refusal to admit a male into its women's nursing
school was unconstitutional. 458 U.S. at 733. Feminist scholars debate whether Justice
O'Connor herself speaks with a feminine perspective. For contrasting views of Justice
O'Connor, see Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim
"A Different Voice"?, 15 Harv. Women's Li., Spring 1992, at 37 and Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543
(1986).
19. 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. The "strict scrutiny" test was devised by the court to test the legality of dispa-
rate treatment based on an individual's race. Race-based discrimination is inherently
suspect. "[I]n 'order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show
that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that its use of the classification is "necessary... to the accomplishment" of its purpose
or the safeguarding of its interest.'" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 305 (1978) (citations omitted).
21. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CiJ., dissenting).
22. Il. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
23. See 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, Ci., dissenting) (citing Justice O'Connor
who recognized that "Batson does not apply 'outside the uniquely sensitive area of
race.'" (citation omitted)).
24. See infra part III.A (discussing women and the venire).
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fortunately, in following Batson without question, the J.E.B. Court
failed to recognize the distinction between race and gender z5
The Court in J.E.B. was faced with facts clearly indicating that the
individual juror's gender was the only factor the prosecution consid-
ered.26 Many experienced attorneys use gender, however, along with
other characteristics, in deciding which jurors are most likely to under-
stand a specific case. In future decisions, the Court should recognize
the differences between the genders and refuse to extend its decision
to require gender dryness in the jury selection process. Furthermore,
the Court should limit the prohibition adopted in J.E.B. to peremp-
tory strikes which are based solely on gender and not strikes which are
based on gender in addition to individual characteristics z
This Article explores the path the Court should take to limit the
prohibitions in J.E.B. because of the differences between men and wo-
men, and to save the peremptory challenge from extinction. Part I
discusses the history and current use of the peremptory challenge
from both legal and practical perspectives. Part II reviews the consti-
tutional developments in the area of race-based jury exclusion. The
history reflects the Court's actions which ultimately placed jurors'
rights ahead of litigants' rights. Part I chronicles the case law ad-
dressing the historical exclusion of women from juries. Additionally,
part III identifies the basis of the case law that recognizes the different
perspective women bring to the jury. Part IV discusses why J.E.B. is
incorrectly based on a premise that female and male jurors are not
different. Part IV also includes the development of feminist thought
on the issue of "difference" and the contribution of social science to
the difference debate. Part V discusses the role of gender in jury se-
lection, and concludes that J.E.B. should be limited to allow gender to
be a factor in the jury selection process.
I. TiE ROLE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. Jury Selection Process
The peremptory challenge is the final step in the jury selection pro-
cess.28 Before the lawyers assert any peremptory challenges, the ju-
rors have been qualified in several different ways. Initially, the jury
pool is comprised of individuals living within the jurisdiction who
25. The majority in J.E.B. stated, "Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be
axiomatic. . . ." 114 S. CL at 1422.
26. I& at 1426.
27. For a discussion on the use of gender as a single factor in deciding whether to
use a peremptory strike, see discussion infra notes 323-27.
28. For a summary of jury procedures in the federal system, see Jody George et
aL, Handbook on Jury Use in the Federal District Courts (1989).
1995]
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qualify under the state or federal statutes to serve on a jury.29 Jury
pool lists are compiled from a variety of sources including voter regis-
tration lists, telephone directories, property tax rolls, and driver's li-
cense registrations.30 The jury commissioner then randomly selects
several hundred jurors31 to serve for a specified court term.
The venire is assembled on the first day of trial and the court and
the lawyers begin the process of selecting jurors to serve on the petit
jury. First, the court and the litigants question the jurors32 in a process
called voir dire.33 In recent years, federal and state courts have lim-
29. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act governs the selection of jurors in
the Federal Courts. Title 28 of the United States Code sets forth the criteria which
will disqualify individuals from being part of the jury pool:
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided
for a period of one year within the judicial district;(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a
degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification
form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satis-
factory jury services; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been
convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been
restored.
28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b) (1988).
30. James J. Gobert & Walter E. Jordan, Jury Selection: The Law, Art, and Sci-
ence of Selecting a Jury 150-52 (2d ed. 1990).
31. Individuals may also be excused or exempted from service prior to the actualjury selection process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (b) (5), (6) (1988).
32. The voir dire process differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in several differ-
ent ways. The court can conduct the entire questioning of the panel and may permit
the attorneys to supplement the oral questioning with written questions. Many fed-
eral courts conduct voir dire in this manner. Some state courts provide for the pri-
mary questioning to be conducted by the lawyers themselves. The most common rule
permits initial examination of the jury by the court, followed by examination by the
lawyers. See Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27
Stan. L. Rev. 545, 548-49 (1975).
Additionally, the jurisdictions differ on the scope of the examination. Some juris-
dictions limit the voir dire to the narrow area of challenges for cause. Other jurisdic-
tions allow more extensive questioning. Finally, the questioning can be directed to
individual jurors or to the entire venire as a whole. However, the trend has been to
reduce the time devoted to this part of the trial by limiting the amount of questioning
allowed. See id at 546-49. A 1977 survey of the federal courts conducted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States revealed that 77% of the responding judges
permitted no direct attorney participation in voir dire. Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., From
the Bench; Lawyer Voir Dire, Litig., Winter 1985, at 5, 5; see also Hans Zeisel and
Shari S. Riamond, The Effect of the Peremptory Challenge of Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 491, 512 (1978) (observing
that the voir dire process itself has an effect on the final jury in impressing upon thejurors the "importance of their task" and enhancing "their awareness of their duty to
decide the case fairly and impartially").
33. This Article does not address the purposes and goals of voir dire (the question
and answer portion of the jury selection process). One article enumerated the follow-
ing eight goals:(1) To reveal grounds for potential challenges for cause....
1E.B. v. ALABAMA
ited the ability of attorneys to question prospective jurors regarding
the information necessary to make an intelligent peremptory chal-
lenge.' One court observed that "[p]eremptory challenges are worth-
less if trial counsel is not afforded an opportunity to gain the necessary
information upon which to base such strikes. 35 Even when the court
permits questioning, empirical studies have shown that the informa-
tion given by prospective jurors is misleading for a variety of
reasons. 6
After questioning the jurors, the lawyers may then exercise a chal-
lenge for cause or a peremptory challenge.37 Challenges for cause are
unlimited in number,38 however, the court must find that cause ex-
(2) To reveal information that will help the attorney exercise peremptory
challenges intelligently....
(3) To prepare the jurors for the proof, and in so doing to emphasize
favorable facts and downplay unfavorable ones....
(4) To prepare the jurors for the law by emphasizing favorable law and
attempting to limit the effect of unfavorable law....
(5) To develop rapport with the jury....
(6) To obtain commitments from the jury....
(7) To personalize the client...
(8) To advocate the client's case....
Judge David Hittner & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in Federal Civil Litigation:
General Procedures, New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 407,
433-34 (1992).
34. See supra note 32 (discussing the voir dire process).
35. United States v. Tble, 630 F.2d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States
v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1978)).
36. See, eg., Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 503 (1965) (stating that reasons for prospective jurors' lack of candor
include: desire to serve on jury;, nervousness; and lack of follow-up questions); see
also Susan E. Jones, Judge Versus Attorney Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Inves-
tigation of Juror Candor, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 131 (1987) (concluding that attor-
neys rather than judges can elicit more candor from venire members because the
members are less concerned with pleasing attorneys than judges).
37. Commentators, and the majority in J.E.B., suggest that the answer to the slow
elimination of peremptory challenges is to expand voir dire. There are several
problems, however, with attempting to elicit the information required to exercise a
peremptory challenge based on the differences described in part IV of this Article.
First, devising questions that will reveal a person's way of reasoning and thinking is
difficult for social scientists and almost impossible for practicing attorneys. Second,
studies determining an individual's reasoning take hours to perform while attorneys
have limited time to question jurors. Third, the juror in most respects will not be
consciously aware of how he or she analyzes a moral dilemma and, therefore, will be
unable to communicate this information to the attorneys. See William T. Pizzi, Batson
v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97,127-28;
see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra part IV (discussing,
in part, that jurors are unaware of their unconscious biases).
38. In most states, peremptory challenges are limited in number by statute. For
examples of statutes that limit the number of permissible peremptory challenges see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b); Fa. Stat Ann. § 913.08 (West 1985); IlL Ann. Stat. ch. 725
para. 115-4 (Smith-Hurd 1992); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 270.15 (McKinney 1992); see
also Annotation, Number of and Procedure for Exercising Peremptory Challenges Al-
lowed in Federal Criminal Trial for Selection of Regular Jurors-Modern Cases, 110
A.L.R. Fed. 626 (1992).
1995]
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ists.39 Challenges for cause are usually statutorily based and very lim-
ited in scope.4 ° Critics have suggested that, due to the narrow
definition of the challenge for cause, it is effective in eliminating only
"the most blatant biases."41
While challenges for cause are based on an objective standard, per-
emptory challenges are based on a subjective standard.42 Lawyers ex-
ercise peremptory challenges "without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. '43 Because
of the scarcity of information on prospective jurors, stereotyping is an
essential ingredient in exercising peremptory challenges. Lawyers
often base decisions on past jury experience and jury selection litera-
ture describing how jurors are likely to view the client's case. When a
lawyer must exercise peremptory challenges based on a limited
amount of individualized information, stereotypes may be a "plausible
... basis for [their] action . . . ." Barbara Babcock45 asserts that
peremptory challenges are beneficial because they allow the system to
avoid "trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes. '46
Although the use of benign stereotyping in peremptory challenges has
been approved by the Court,47 J.E.B. has now limited the scope of
what is "permissible" stereotyping.48
B. History of the Peremptory Challenge
In Swain v. Alabama,49 the Court recognized the long history of the
peremptory challenge, describing it as "one of the most important of
39. Judges usually will not excuse jurors for cause unless the showing of bias is
blatant. See Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev.
235, 243-44 (1968). To excuse a juror for bias, the court must find that the juror
cannot put aside bias and decide the case based on the evidence and the instructions.
State v. Deaner, 334 S.E.2d 627, 629 (W. Va. 1985); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 634
S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1982).
40. Most statutes enumerate the limited scope of the challenge for cause. The
grounds for cause usually include: blood relationship; business relationship or friend-
ship with the parties or attorneys; preconceived ideas about the merits of the case;
prior personal experience on a jury involving the case; or sympathy. Gobert & Jordan,
supra note 30, at 199-200.
41. Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 337, 340 (1982).
42. Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for
Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 Baylor L. Rev. 947, 953
(1994).
43. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citations omitted).
44. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 211 (1989).
45. Babcock, supra note 32.
46. Id. at 553.
47. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 n.14 (1994) (holding that
peremptory challenges made on the basis of a group's characteristics other than race
or gender are generally permitted).
48. See id. at 1429; see also infra part V.
49. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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the rights secured to the accused."5 The first recorded use of these
challenges dates back to Roman history.51 Its use continued through-
out the English Common law and was brought to the United States on
the Mayflower 2 Use of the peremptory challenge in America was
originally based on common law adopted from England. 3 The right
to a peremptory challenge survived virtually without question until
the twentieth century.-' Congress established peremptory challenges
in the 1790 Act for all felonies punishable by death. 5 Where the of-
fense was not punishable by death, the government and the defendant
were always considered to have the right to peremptory challenges,
although the source of this right is not clear.56 Although subsequent
Acts of Congress changed the number of peremptory challenges avail-
able, the viability of the peremptory challenge was never seriously
questioned until 1965.57
The right to peremptory challenges in criminal cases has always
been well-recognized. The Supreme Court cases addressing peremp-
tory challenges deal almost exclusively with the prosecutor's right to
peremptory challenges and limitations on that right.51 In Hayes v.
Missouri,5 9 the Court stated that "[ilt is to be remembered that such
impartiality requires not only freedom from any bias against the ac-
cused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between
him and the state the scales are to be evenly held."'
In Swain, the African-American defendant argued that his constitu-
tional right to a fair trial was violated when the state exercised its
peremptory challenges to exclude all African-American members of
the venire.61 The defendant supported his claim with statistics demon-
strating that although African-Americans constituted twenty-six per-
cent of the population in Talledega County, Alabama, no African-
American had served on a petit jury in that county in more than fif-
teen years.62 Despite these astonishing statistics, the Court held that
50. Id. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
51. Under Roman law, both parties proposed up to one hundred jurors each. The
opposing party could strike fifty jurors which left one hundred jurors to decide the
case. Carlson, supra note 42, at 953 n24 (citation omitted).
52. Charlan Nemeth et al, From the '50s to the '70s: Women in Jury Deliberations,
39 Sociometry 293, 293 (1976).
53. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213-14.
54. See id. at 216-17.
55. 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
56. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 (citations omitted).
57. See id. at 209 (discussing the petitioner's claim "relating to the exercise of per-
emptory challenges to exclude Negroes from serving on petit juries").
58. See, e.g., i& at 202 (objecting to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to strike African-American members of the venire); see also Hayes v. Mflssouri, 120
U.S. 68 (1887).
59. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
60. Id. at 70.
61. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205, 210.
62. Id. at 202.
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the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated, emphasiz-
ing that peremptory challenges are a vital part of the voir dire pro-
cess. 63 Commentators echoed this sentiment in the following years.'M
Although the Court has continued to give lip service to the impor-
tance of the peremptory challenge, its actions elevating the juror's
rights to serve on the jury, and disregarding the issues of difference,
imply that the peremptory challenge's importance has declined.
C. Purposes and Functions of Peremptory Challenges
1. Perception of Fairness
Blackstone recognized that a primary purpose for peremptory chal-
lenges was to allow a defendant to participate in the selection of the
individuals who will decide his or her fate. A "prisoner ... should
have a good opinion of his jury,"65 and "the law wills not that he
should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a
prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such dis-
like." 66 The peremptory challenge allows a party to remove jurors
who may be inclined toward the opposing party, regardless of the ba-
sis.67 The courts have long recognized that a defendant "should not
be held to accept a juror, apparently indifferent, whom he distrusted
for any reason or for no reason. '' 8
By increasing the litigants' participation in the selection of their
jury, the system ensures that verdicts are more acceptable to the par-
ties.69 As one commentator stated, "[I]n a real sense the jury belongs
to the litigant: he chooses it."'70 Some have acknowledged that assur-
ing the litigants of the jury's fairness is the peremptory challenge's
"most important function."'7' As Justice Frankfurter notes, "The %
pearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality."
63. Id. at 202, 219, 221-22. "In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system
and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of
jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prose-
cutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case." Id. at 222.
64. Babcock, supra note 32, at 555.
65. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *353. As Blackstone notes, a prisoner's
discomfort may be based on "impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another." Id.
66. Id.
67. See Pizzi, supra note 37.
68. Lamb v. State, 36 Wis. 424, 426 (1874).
69. Frederick V. Olsen, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Reasoned or
Result-Oriented Jurisprudence? 12 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 497, 499-500 (1992).
70. Babcock, supra note 32, at 552.
71. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In contrast, Professor Amar, observes, "But what about the legitimacy of the verdict
for the rest of society-We the People who see weird juries, chosen in weird and
expensive ways, generate weird outcomes? And the trial judge, appellate court, legis-
lature, and grand jury are legitimate even though the defendant didn't hand pick any
500 [Vol. 64
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2. Protection of Voir Dire
Blackstone reasoned that the peremptory challenge also served as
protection for attorneys attempting to establish challenges for cause.
If an attorney fails in asserting a challenge for cause, "perhaps the
bare questioning [of] his indifference may sometimes provoke a re-
sentment."73 Ii United States v. Hamilton,74 the court recognized the
necessity of peremptory challenges in enabling "counsel to ascertain
the possibility of bias through probing questions... by removing the
fear of incurring a juror's hostility. '75 When the court finds a chal-
lenge for cause insufficient, a peremptory challenge may be used to
exclude that person because the attorney believes the challenge for
cause was sufficient or the person being questioned was insulted
merely by the questioning of his impartiality. Challenges for cause
will become unworkable if peremptory challenges are rendered
extinct.
3. Elimination of Fringe Jurors
The peremptory challenge is more than a mere custom 76 or supple-
ment to the challenge for cause.7 It is the method for obtaining a fair
and impartial body to sit as the trier of fact. The judicial system does
not anticipate that each juror will be impartial, but seeks an impartial
jury as a whole in order to achieve the ultimate goal of fairness. 78
Fairness is guaranteed to parties under the ideology that they are enti-
tled to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. The
alternative strikes provided to the parties enable each side to strike
extremes79 and, therefore, be left with an "impartial jury."' The real
purpose of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate the extremes of
the spectrum. The process is an attempt to "winnow[ ] out possible
(though not demonstrable) sympathies and antagonisms on both sides,
to the end that the jury will be the fairest possible."'" By eliminating
of them...." Akhil R. Amar, Reuniting Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1169, 1182-83 (1995) (Edward L. Bassett, Jr. Lecture on Constitutional Law).
73. Blackstone, supra note 65, at *346.
74. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
75. Id. at 1042 (citation omitted).
76. See supra part LB (discussing the history of peremptory challenges).
77. See supra part LC.2 and accompanying text.
78. Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or
Privilege of Difference?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1120 (1994).
79. In my Trial Advocacy class, I use a continuum to demonstrate the obtainment
of an impartial jury. On one end of the continuum are those jurors with extreme bias
for the defendant. On the other end are those jurors who would be viewed as ex-
tremely biased for the prosecutor. In the middle are those jurors likely to be chosen
in light of each side striking those jurors at the ends of the continuum.
80. James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminolgy
269 (1988).
81. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the extremes, the selection of an impartial or unbiased jury is
ensured. 82
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in J.E.B., opines that
the peremptory challenge is an invaluable tool for eliminating the "ex-
tremes of partiality on both sides. '' 83 At the core of that tool is the
recognition that the challenge is often based on intuition, "exper-
ienced hunches and educated guesses." 84 Justice O'Connor believes
that the peremptory challenge loses its effectiveness when lawyers are
forced to articulate the reasons for a challenge.85 When peremptory
challenges become less discretionary and more akin to challenges for
cause, lawyers are deterred from challenging jurors they believe are
partial to the other side.86 Lawyers become concerned that if the chal-
lenge is not accepted, the juror may feel animosity toward the litigant
based on the lawyer's attempt to exclude the juror from the jury.87
The peremptory challenge does not address the competency or
qualifications of an individual juror. To the contrary, it addresses liti-
gants' legitimate concerns in having their cases judged by individuals
who are open to the litigants' perspectives. The peremptory challenge
"enabl[es] each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most
partial toward the other side."' In his dissent in J.E.B., Justice Scalia
stated that "[w]omen [are not] categorically excluded from juries be-
cause of doubt that they [are] competent; women are stricken from
juries by peremptory challenge because of doubt that they are well
disposed to the striking party's case."'89
Historically, the peremptory challenge has been an important part
of the American justice system. It has served not only to provide liti-
gants with the sense that they participated in the process, but also to
eliminate bias from the jury as a whole. The peremptory challenge
has survived two hundred years because it is an essential part of the
system. Recent jurisprudence restricts the unhampered exercise of
peremptory challenges. A review of that history reveals that the re-
strictions placed on race-based peremptory challenges stemmed from
the recognition of the rights of similarly situated individuals to be
treated alike.90 On the other hand, the cases9' addressing the pres-
ence of women on the jury involve the recognition that men and wo-
men bring distinct perspectives and thought processes to the jury.
82. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 91 (1986)).





88. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990).
89. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See infra part II.
91. See infra part III.
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I1. THE EROSION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. Pre-Batson: The Unlimited Peremptory Challenge
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutional parameters
of jury composition in Strauder v. West Wrginia.92 In Strauder, an Af-
rican-American defendant was convicted of murder by an all-white,
all-male jury.9 3 On appeal, the Court addressed a state statute prohib-
iting African-American males from serving on grand juries or petit
juries in West Virginia and discussed a defendant's right to be tried by
a jury drawn from a venire including members of his race.9 The
Court determined that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the de-
fendant was denied equal protection because he was not tried by a
jury selected from a panel including African-American males.9s The
Court compared the rights of African-American defendants 6 to the
rights enjoyed by white male defendants. The Court found each
group to be entitled to a jury selected from a pool which included
persons of their respective race.97 Although the Court held that under
the Equal Protection Clause a defendant is entitled to a jury selected
from a pool consisting of individuals from his race, the defendant is
not entitled to be tried by a jury that is "composed in whole or in part
of persons of his own race or color."98s The composition of the venire
cannot consist entirely of white males, but apparently the jury can. 9
The Court first addressed whether the use of race-based peremp-
tory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause in Swain v. Ala-
bama.100 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause is violated
if the defendant demonstrates the consistent, absolute exclusion of
African-American jurors. 10 To prove that the government violated
the defendant's rights in the use of its peremptory challenges under
Swain, however, the defendant must show systematic exclusion of
92. 100 U.s. 303 (1879). This case actually dealt with the jury pool, not the com-
position of the petit jury.
93. Id. at 304.
94. Id. at 305.
95. Id. at 310.
96. Courts and commentators often incorrectly cite Strauder for the proposition
that it is the juror who is injured by the race-based peremptory challenge. A prime
example is Batson v. Kentucky, where the Court explained that "[ass long ago as
Strauder ... the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury
service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the
excluded juror." 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Actually, the holding of Strauder was based
on the rights of the defendant. It was only in dicta that the court recognized that the
excluded juror was affected, stating that "[tihe very fact that colored people are sin-
gled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration
of the law, as jurors, because of their color... is practically a brand upon them...."
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
97. Id. at 305.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
101. 380 U.S. at 223-24.
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blacks over a period of time in addition to their exclusion in the de-
fendant's case.' 02 Evidence of the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges against African-Americans in a single case is not sufficient
to bring a constitutional claim against the state.'0 3 To prove system-
atic exclusion, the Court required a use of peremptory challenges that
would cause the same situation prohibited in Strauder-the total ex-
clusion of African-Americans from jury service."° As a result of the
defendant's heavy burden, few were successful in asserting the equal
protection argument.
B. Batson v. Kentucky: Limiting Peremptory Challenges to
Protect the Defendant
In 1986, the Court readdressed the requirements of Swain, and
overruled that decision. In Batson v. Kentucky, 0 5 an African-Ameri-
can man was convicted of second degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods.' 6 At trial, he objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude all four of the African-Americans in the ve-
nire. 10 7 The trial court overruled his objections and Batson was con-
victed by an all-white jury.'08 The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause' 0 9 is violated if the prosecutor in a criminal case
"challenge[s] potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to
consider the State's case against a black defendant." 1 0
Although the Court in Batson referred to "the harm that discrimi-
natory jury selection inflicts upon the excluded juror,""' the language
used by the Court indicates that it based its finding of an equal protec-
tion violation" 2 solely on the rights of the defendant. 1 3 In Batson,
the Court articulated a test for trial judges to follow in determining
whether a prosecutor has violated the Equal Protection Clause in his
102. I at 227.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 223-24.
105. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
106. Id. at 82-83.
107. Id. at 83.
108. Id.
109. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist noted that
the petitioner in Batson specifically declined to use the Equal Protection Clause as a
basis for his argument at the trial court and first appellate level, relying instead on the
Sixth Amendment. Id. at 112 (Burger, CJ. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 89.
111. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 87) (internal quotations omitted).
112. The Court failed to recognize that in fact the petitioner did not base his equal
protection claim on the prospective juror's rights.
113. In his dissent in Powers, Justice Scalia stated that Batson recognized that a
defendant had the right to be tried by juries from which members of their own race
have not been intentionally excluded. 499 U.S. at 425. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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or her use of a peremptory challenge." 4 The test itself is evidence of
the Court's basis for the violation. First, the defendant must be a
member of a cognizable group." 5 If the equal protection violation
was centered on the rights of the juror to sit on a jury, the race of the
defendant would be of little or no consequence. 6 The test also re-
quires that the juror who was stricken be a member of the same cogni-
zable group as the defendant."17 Again, such a requirement is
inconsistent with a violation arising from the rights of the juror, but is
consistent with the defendant's right to be tried by people similar to
himself.
Clearly, in Batson, the violation stemmed from the rights of the ac-
cused and not from the rights of the juror. The Court merely men-
tioned the right to serve on a jury in dicta, yet it has been elevated by
case law and commentary to a basic right that must be protected.",
The parties' rights to a fair trial, including the right to due process and
equal protection, are the rights that should be given the most weight.
The death of the peremptory challenge became inevitable when the
courts shifted the focus from litigants' rights to third parties' rights.
As Justice Thomas observed in his dissenting opinion in Georgia v.
McCollum,119 the limiting of peremptory challenges based on the ju-
ror's rights is "a serious misordering of our priorities," for it means
"we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of
the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors,
who faces imprisonment or even death.'
114. Under the Batson three-part test, the defendant must initially show that he or
she is a member of a "cognizable racial group" and the prosecution used one of its
peremptory challenges to remove a member of that group. Secondly, the defendant
must show that "relevant circumstances" raise an inference of discrimination. The
trial judge then decides whether the defendant has made a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination. If the trial court finds that the defendant met the standard,
the prosecutor must proffer a nondiscriminatory explanation for the allegedly race-
based peremptory challenge. Although the reason must be related to the case, it
"need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." The trial judge
must again weigh the evidence to determine if the defendant has established pur-
poseful discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). Recently, the
Supreme Court reiterated the three-part test in determining validity of a peremptory
challenge. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
The above is the test in theory. My experience as a prosecutor, however, is differ-
ent. In most instances, the criminal defendant must only point out that a member of a
cognizable group has been excluded and then the prosecutor has the burden of prov-
ing that his or her peremptory challenge was race-neutral. At the trial level, the pros-
ecutor is required to prove a negative, that the challenge was not based on race. This
is almost impossible. Therefore, the judge is inclined to leave the juror on the jury. In
addition, the prosecutor is unable to appeal the trial court's decision to deny a per-
emptory challenge.
115. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
116. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
118. Grossman, supra note 78, at 1128.
119. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
120. Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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C. Extension of Batson Prior to J.E.B: Shifting the Rationale to
Protection of the Juror
In Powers v. Ohio, 2' the Court elevated the rights of prospective
jurors, which it had merely acknowledged in dicta in Batson. During
the trial, Powers, a white criminal defendant, objected to the prosecu-
tion's exercise of six of its nine peremptory challenges to remove Afri-
can-Americans from the jury."2 The defendant was convicted of
murder.'" On appeal, he asserted that the prosecutor had violated
his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community.'" Citing Holland v. Illinois,125 the Court summarily dis-
missed the Sixth Amendment claim, stating that it did not apply to
peremptory challenges. 26 The Court further held that a criminal de-
fendant, no matter what his or her race, had "third party standing"' 27
to assert the equal protection rights of African-American jurors, who
had been excluded by the government through use of peremptory
challenges.' 8 Accordingly, the Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction based on his assertion of the third party rights of the jury.'29
Powers is a landmark decision in that it is the first time the Court
explicitly recognized the equal protection rights of a juror. 30
In Powers, the Court also discussed the "multiple ends"' 3' served in
Batson. The defendant's rights are only one set of rights to be pro-
121. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
122. 1& at 403. The composition of the jury that convicted the defendant is unclear.
It is also unclear whether the defense exercised any of its peremptory challenges
against African-American members of the venire. The Court did not require a show-
ing of any injury to the defendant as a result of the exclusion of the juror. It reversed
the defendant's conviction as a sanction for the State's violation of the individual
juror's equal protection rights.
123. Id. at 403.
124. Id.
125. 493 U.S. 474 (1990). In Holland, the white, male petitioner objected to the
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black venire members from
the jury. Id. at 476. On appeal, the petitioner asserted only that his Sixth Amendment
right to be tried by a representative cross-section of the community had been violated.
Id. at 477-78. The Court held that both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments offer
distinct protection to the parties and to the judicial system itself. Id. at 488. Specifi-
cally, the Sixth Amendment mandates an impartial jury, not a representative one. Id.
For this reason, the Court held that a party may not invoke the Sixth Amendment to
contest the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 487.
126. Powers, 499 U.S. at 409.
127. The issue of third party standing, and the dangers inherent in holding that a
litigant has standing to assert the rights of a juror, is outside the purview of this Arti-
cle. The issue of third party standing initially requires a determination that the first
party has a right upon which the third party can stand. This Article discusses the
creation of the first party right of the juror to the detriment of the litigants.
128. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
129. Id. at 416.
130. Id. at 417-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing a history of cases which focus on
the rights of the defendant as opposed to the rights of the juror).
131. Id. at 406.
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tected. The extension of Batson to cover all litigants, irrespective of
their status in the case or relationship to the juror, was designed to
remedy the harm to the "dignity of the persons" and to the "integrity
of the system."' a 2 The Court found the right to serve on a jury to be
one of the basic rights of citizenship.' 33 The continued use of the jury
system is justified, according to the Court, because it is an "opportu-
nity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of jus-
tice.' 13 As with other rights and obligations of citizenship, the
purpose of the jury system is not to serve the citizens; on the contrary,
citizens serve the jury system.3 5 To reason otherwise would be to put
the cart before the horse.
The expansion of Batson, and resulting decline of the peremptory
challenge, continued with the Court's decisions in Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co.'36 and Georgia v. McCollum.137 Both cases ex-
tended the Batson limitation to other litigants: the civil litigant in
Edmonson, 8 and the criminal defendant in McCollum.13 9 These
cases actually dealt with the expansion of the definition of "state ac-
tor," however, they also served to reinforce litigants' third party
standing to assert the equal protection rights of jurors.
Beginning with Powers, the Court elevated the rights of the juror
above the rights of the litigant-basing the decisions on the Equal
Protection Clause and emphasizing the rights of similarly situated
people to be treated equally. The prohibition against the exclusion of
individuals from jury service based on race has historically been pre-
mised on different rights than the prohibition against gender-based
exclusion. Throughout women's history of jury service, the courts
have emphasized the different perspective women bring to the court-
room. Unfortunately, in JE.B., the Court lost sight of this vital
distinction.
III. WOMEN AND JURY SELECION
A. Women on the Venire
In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the presence of
women on juries 4 in a case involving the Court's supervisory powers
over lower federal courts. In Ballard v. United States,'4' the Court
132. Id.
133. Id. at 407.
134. Id. at 406.
135. See supra text accompanying note 117.
136. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
137. 112 S. Ct 2348 (1992).
138. 111 S. CL at 2089.
139. 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
140. For a history of women's struggle to sit on juries, see Barbara A. Babcock, A
Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights And Jury Service, 61 U. Cii. L Rev. 1139,
1160-71 (1993).
141. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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ruled that in a state where women were eligible to serve as jurors, a
federal court could not exclude female jurors from the venire.142 In
addressing the defendant's right to a fair trial, the Court focused on
Congress' intent to provide defendants a representative jury'43 which
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 14 A citizen's right to sit
on a jury was not at issue, rather, the Court focused on the right of the
litigant to be tried by a representative jury. 45
The underlying rationale of the representative jury requirement is
that women bring something different to the jury. In Ballard, the
Court stated, "The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible....' 46
The Court further acknowledged that "a distinct quality is lost" if wo-
men are excluded from a jury.147 The Ballard Court distinguished the
exclusion of females from the exclusion of jurors based on race or
economic status and stated, "The exclusion of one [sex] may indeed
make the jury less representative of the community than would be
true if an economic or racial group were excluded.""' Thus, from the
very beginning the Court recognized that the jury service issues in-
volving race and gender differ.149
In Taylor v. Louisiana,50 the Court reiterated its finding that fe-
male jurors bring a distinctive quality to the jury and prohibited the
systematic exclusion of females from the venire.15 ' In Taylor, the de-
fendant was indicted for aggravated kidnapping. 5 2 Prior to trial, he
moved to quash the petit jury venire, alleging that women were sys-
tematically excluded from the pool, therefore depriving him of his
constitutional right to "a fair trial by jury of a representative segment
of the community.' 1 53 The defendant's motion was denied, and after
being convicted and sentenced to death, he appealed.' 4 Although the
Louisiana Criminal Code permitted female jurors, it required women
142. Id. at 193-95.
143. This case, like Strauder, discussed the venire or jury pool instead of the actual
make up of the petit jury which heard the case. The Court in Ballard concentrated on
the qualifications of women to sit on juries, not the preference of women over men on
juries. Id. at 193.
144. Id. at 191.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 193.
147. Id- at 194.
148. Id.
149. Grossman defines the difference between race and gender in the area of juror
service as the Court applying a model of citizenship rights to the issue of race-based
jury exclusion, and a model of representative juries to the gender-based jury exclu-
sion. Grossman, supra note 78, at 1123-36. While this is certainly a legitimate charac-
terization, it is important to realize why this model of difference existed. I believe
such a difference arose out of a basic understanding of human nature that women are
distinct from men.
150. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
151. Id. at 533.





to affirmatively register to be eligible to sit on a jury.155 The operation
of this statute had a systematic, negative impact on the number of
women that were actually called to jury service.156 The Court also
addressed whether a "jury-selection system which operates to exclude
from jury service an identifiable class of citizens constituting 53% of
eligible jurors in the community comports with the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments."' 7 The Court answered this question in the
negative and found a violation of the fair cross-section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment due to the systematic exclusion of women from
the venire.'58
In Taylor, the Court recognized that controlled studies of women
jurors indicate that they bring to the jury unique perspectives and val-
ues that influence jury deliberations and results. 59 The Court's deci-
sion clearly acknowledges that women constitute a large part of the
community and are distinct from men;160 thus, their systematic exclu-
sion violates the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment.16'
The Court in Taylor dealt with the qualifications of jurors to be in-
cluded in the jury pool and found that women could not be disquali-
fied based on a belief that they were incapable of performing as
jurors.1' 2 The Court recognized that women had historically been
considered unqualified for jury service by virtue of the doctrine of
155. Id. at 523.
156. Id at 525.
157. Id. at 525-26.
158. Id. at 531. Although the Court again required that the venire be a fair cross-
section of the community (to include women in the jury pool), it did not require that
the jury actually chosen mirror the community and reflect the distinctive groups rep-
resented in the population. Id at 530.
159. Id. at 532 n.12.
160. There are risks whenever someone takes on the role of being distinct. A good
example of a case where the distinction between males and females leads to the exclu-
sion of women is Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld an affirmative registration statute requiring women to register voluntarily forjury duty before their name would be placed on the venire list. Id. at 69. The Court
focused on the rights of the litigant and found that no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment had occurred in the automatic exemption for female jurors. Id at 65. It
distinguished between male and female jurors based on their separate political and
domestic spheres. Id. at 61-62. The Court stated that despite the "enlightened eman-
cipation of women" in most respects a "woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life." Id.; see also Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 Harv.
Women's LJ., Spring 1986, at 59, 66. HIstorically, the distinction between males and
females has been used to completely disqualify women from juries. Today, instead of
trying to act as though the differences do not exist, we must work toward valuing
those differences and using them to effect change and proper results.
161. 419 U.S. at 531.
162. Id at 537. Again, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), the
Court addressed the issue of qualifications. In Thiel, the jury commissioner and the
clerk of the court systematically excluded any juror from the venire who worked for a
daily wage. Id. at 221-22. The Court in Thiel reasoned that a juror's competence to
render a verdict is not necessarily based on his or her employment; a daily wage
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"propter defectum sexus, a 'defect of sex.' ",163 The Court further
noted that women could no longer be excluded from jury service on
the premise that they serve a distinctive role in society and jury ser-
vice would substantially interfere with that function."6 "If it was ever
the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situ-
ated that none of them should be required to perform jury service,
that time has long since passed."' 65
B. Women and Peremptory Challenges Prior to J.E.B.
During the years between Taylor and J.E.B., the focus shifted from
composition of the venire to selection of the petit jury and use of per-
emptory challenges. In Batson, and its pre-J.E.B. progeny, the
Court's analysis of prohibited uses of peremptory challenges focused
primarily on race and relied on equal protection analysis. 166 Several
lower courts, however, considered whether Batson also prohibits gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, applying the equal protection anal-
ysis formerly reserved to race-based peremptory challenges to gender-
based peremptory challenges. The results varied.167
United States v. Hamilton'" is representative of cases where courts
declined to extend Batson. The Fourth Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the government violated the Equal Protection
Clause by using its peremptory challenges to exclude women from the
jury. In Hamilton, several defendants, males and females, were tried
on various drug-related offenses. 69 The government used three of its
peremptory challenges to exclude women, claiming female jurors
might be "overly sympathetic" to female defendants.'70 The jury that
earner is fully competent to be a juror, and the systematic exclusion of such persons
from jury service cannot be justified by federal or state law. Id. at 222-23.
163. 419 U.S. at 533 n.13.
164. Id. at 533-34.
165. Id. at 537.
166. See supra part II.
167. 114 S. Ct. at 1422 n.1. In J.E.B., the Court recognized that the federal circuits
were divided on whether Batson applies to gender-based peremptory challenges. See
United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), reh'g 960 F.2d 1433, 1437-43
(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges in both criminal and civil trials); cf. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d
215, 218-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Batson); United States v. Nichols, 937
F.2d 1257, 1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1080 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir.
1988) (declining to extend Batson), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). The J.E.B. court also recognized that state courts which
considered the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory challenges were split on
the issue. 114 S. Ct. at 1422 n.1.
168. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
169. Id. at 1039.
170. Id. at 1041. The prosecution was required to explain its peremptory challenges
because the excluded jurors were also black. These peremptory challenges were race-
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ultimately convicted the defendants in Hamilton consisted of nine fe-
males and three males.171
In Hamilton, the court acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause's
application to gender discrimination in other contexts, yet found noth-
ing to suggest that "the Supreme Court would apply normal equal
protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory
challenges."'17 Although the court did not define what was unique
about peremptory challenges, its recitation of the benefits of such
challenges implies a recognition that a juror's gender makes distinc-
tive contributions to jury deliberations. 73
The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that if the Supreme Court desired
to limit the exercise of peremptory challenges based on "gender, age
or other group classification[s]," it would have done so.174 The Fourth
Circuit concluded, however, that "in light of the important position of
the peremptory challenge in our jury system," the Court did not in-
tend that Batson be extended to gender-based peremptory
challenges.'
Not all courts considering the extension of Batson to gender-based
peremptory challenges reached the same conclusion. United States v.
De Gross 76 is the leading pre-JE.B case where Batson was extended
to gender-based peremptory challenges. The defendant in De Gross
was convicted of aiding and abetting the transportation of an alien."'
The district court in De Gross required the defendant to explain its
neutral according to the prosecutor because he based them on the juror's gender, not
race. Id.
171. Id Five women and one man had been seated on the jury when the prosecu-
tion challenged the first of three questioned jurors. The seated jury consisted of seven
women and one man when the next juror was challenged. Lastly, the number of fe-
male jurors had increased to nine when the prosecutor challenged the third and final
juror. Id.
Theorists were concerned that if Batson was not extended to gender-based peremp-
tory challenges, prosecutors could mask the prohibited race-based peremptory chal-
lenges in the cloak of a permitted gender-based peremptory challenge. See Shirley S.
Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky. Will It Keep Women on the Jury?, 3 Berkeley Women's
LJ. 14, 37 (1987-88).
172. 850 F2d at 1042.
173. See id. at 1042. The Hamilton court approvingly quoted Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion in Batson which recognized that "[common human experience,
common sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion polls tell us that it is
likely that certain classes of people statistically have predispositions that would make
them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases." Id. (quoting Batson v. Ken-
tucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Burger, CJ. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). While Chief
Justice Burger referred to race, the quote is much more applicable to what is generally
known about women jurors. See infra part IV. Again, the issue is not the qualification
of jurors, but rather the litigants' preferences. The adversary system creates an impar-
tial jury by allowing each side to strike jurors not because they are unqualified but
because they are not preferred by the advocate. See infra part IV.
174. 850 F.2d at 1042.
175. Id at 1042-43.
176. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
177. Id. at 1419.
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peremptory challenges when the prosecution objected to the defend-
ant's use of its seventh peremptory challenge to strike the seventh
male venireperson. 178 The defendant offered no explanation, 179 and
the district court disallowed the challenge and the venireperson sat on
the jury.180 The defendant was convicted by a jury of three men and
nine women.' 8 1
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied an equal protection standard
and extended the prohibitions in Batson to gender-based peremptory
challenges.182 Although the court recognized the different treatment
afforded race and gender under the Equal Protection Clause, it found
that gender-based peremptory challenges were not substantially re-
lated to the goal of achieving an impartial and fair jury.'8 3 The court
extended Batson based on alleged "harm [to] the excluded venireper-
son."' 84 In De Gross, the court found that "a erson's gender is unre-
lated to her ability to serve as a juror."' 8  The De Gross court
confused the qualifications of a juror with the litigant's preference of
one juror over another. The peremptory challenge deals with the lat-
ter, not the former. 8 6 Had the courts not begun to gloss over the
distinctions between race-based and gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges, the litigant's right to participate in jury selection would have
remained intact.
C. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.
'Twenty years after Taylor, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
gender and jury selection in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,187 where it
addressed gender-based peremptory challenges for the first time. In
J.E.B., a male petitioner claimed his Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights were violated when the prosecution struck male ju-
rors in a paternity and child support trial.' The all-female jury found
the petitioner to be the father of the child.189 The jury composition
resulted from the prosecution striking male jurors and the petitioner
178. Id. at 1419-21. Although the defendant challenged the prosecution's use of a
peremptory challenge to strike a Hispanic female, the court addressed the defendant's
use of peremptory challenges to strike males. Ia. at 1419-20.
179. 1I at 1419.
180. 1L
181. 1& at 1420.
182. Id. at 1423.
183. Id. at 1422.
184. Id
185. Id. (citations omitted).
186. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1437 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
187. Id. at 1419.
188. Id at 1421-22.
189. Id. at 1422.
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striking female jurors.19 ° The Court held the prosecution's striking of
male jurors based on gender to be in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. After a lengthy recitation of
the Equal Protection Clause's history, the Court ruled that
"[i]ntentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the dis-
crimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and
overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and wo-
men."'19  The petitioner argued that Batson should be extended to
gender and the Court agreed, holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges.1-g The major-
ity "recognized that.., potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an
equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from
state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, histori-
cal prejudice."'193
By focusing on the rights of citizens to participate in the judicial
process, the majority in J.E.B. elevated the individual's right to serve
on a jury over the litigant's right to participate in jury selection. The
Court held that "[a]l persons, when granted the opportunity to serve
on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of
discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and rein-
force patterns of historical discrimination."'' 94 The Court was per-
suaded that gender-based peremptory challenges perpetuate women's
historical exclusion from juries. 95 The decision is premised on the
idea that women are disproportionately excluded from juries when
gender-based peremptory challenges are permitted. "Gender-based
peremptories . . . reinvoke the historical denial of women's civic
rights."' 96 This idea, however, is simply not borne out in the cases or
statistics.
Although the Court fails to recognize the distinction,97 the peti-
tioner in J.E.B. was tried by an all-female jury and complained of the
exclusion of males.'98 Additionally, a survey reveals that in approxi-
mately half of the cases decided under Batson, males, not females,
190. Id. at 1421-22. Interestingly, the defense in J.E.B. struck the last male juror,
thereby perfecting the defendant's appeal under the Court's holding in Batson.
191. Id. at 1422.
192. Id. at 1421.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 1428.
195. Id.
196. Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1920, 1922 (1992).
197. The Court in J.E.B. explained, "In recent cases we have emphasized that indi-
vidual jurors themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection proce-
dures .... Contrary to respondent's suggestion, this right extends to both men and
women." J.E.B., 114 S. CL at 1427-28.
198. Id. at 1422.
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were excluded from the jury."9 Further, data recently compiled from
the District of Columbia suggest that men, not women, are excluded
from juries.2" The study revealed that women were more likely to be
seated as jurors while men were apt to be struck from the jury.21' In
reality, women are not being told they are unqualified jurors, but
rather that they are actually preferred.
The Court in J.E.B. was seemingly unconcerned with the number of
women on the jury, stating that the "exclusion of even one juror for
impermissible reasons harms that juror .... The Court was not
persuaded by respondent's argument that male and female jurors re-
act differently to particular issues.20 3 Further, the Court held that
even if there is truth to the assertion that males and females are differ-
ent, it does not justify the use of that information in choosing jurors.20 4
In Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, she opined that the ma-jority has created a new rule of relevancy in which gender is irrelevant
in jury selection.20 5 She believed that "to say that gender makes no
difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no differ-
ence as a matter of fact."20 6 Justice O'Connor correctly recognized
that women and men bring distinct perspectives and life experiences
to the courtroom. "[O]ne need not be a sexist to share the intuition
199. The research has shown that such statistics are true outside the area of Batson
cases. "Almost every sex discrimination case which has been won at the Supreme
Court level has been brought by a man." Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination [1984], in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in
Law and Gender 5 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) [heremaf-
ter Feminist Legal Theory]; see David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for
Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 Law & Ineq. 33, 34 & n.4 (1984) (listing the sex
discrimination cases heard by the Supreme Court).
200. Karen L. Cipriani, Note, The Numbers Don't Add Up: Challenging The Prem-
ise of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1253, 1264-68 (1994).
201. The study included 4302 persons who were called to jury service for criminal
and civil trials. A total of 105 juries were studied during the six-month period be-
tween January 1993 and June 1993. Of the women who were called to jury service,
34% participated as jurors, while of the men called only 25.2% ultimately served asjurors. Id. at 1265-67.
202. 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.13.
203. Id. at 1426 n.9.
204. Id. at 1427 n.11. The court in J.E.B. stated:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes
used to justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot
support discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection. We have
made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause ....
Id.
205. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
discusses three "costs" of the majority's ruling. First, the trial process will be ex-
tended by requiring a Batson hearing in almost every case. Second, the opinion fur-
ther erodes, and ultimately eliminates, the role of the peremptory challenge in the
trial process. Finally, the opinion substantially limits the use of peremptory chal-
lenges even when based on accurate assumptions regarding gender. Id. at 1431-33.
206. Id. at 1432.
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that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience
will be relevant to his or her view of the case."'2 7 According to Justice
O'Connor, the majority opinion is "a statement about what this Na-
tion stands for, rather than a statement of fact"'  and an attempt to
further eliminate discrimination at the cost of limiting litigants' ability
to act on "sometimes accurate gender-based assumptions. ' "2 9
In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia called the majority's opinion an
"inspiring demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-
thinking we Justices are in matters pertaining to the sexes."210 He
opined that the majority is damaging a historically essential part of the
trial process for the sole purpose of showing disapproval of "male
chauvinist attitudes."2 1' To further the goal of a "unisex" society, Jus-
tice Scalia said the majority is willing to act inconsistently with past
findings in Taylor v. Louisiana.21 Justice Scalia reminded the major-
ity that in Taylor, the Court found that "controlled studies... have
concluded that women bring to juries their own perspectives and val-
ues that influence both jury deliberation and result. 2 1 3 Justice Scalia
asserted, however, that the majority would characterize any acknowl-
edged differences between male and female jurors as "hateful 'stere-
otyping.' "214 The dissent further suggests that a determination of
whether female and male jurors are different would be important if
the Court considered the litigant's rights instead of the rights of the
individual jurors.215
J.E.B. is premised on the theory that men and women are the same,
even as jurors. If women and men are different as jurors, however,
the Equal Protection Clause should not require litigants to disregard
these differences2 16 for the sake of an institutional good. Two ques-




210. I& at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 149-64.
213. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sealia, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at
532 n.12).
214. Id.
215. Justice Scalia recognized that if the juror's gender has no effect on the juror's
perception, then the petitioner would be unable to show any injury. Thus, the only
basis for his claim can be the injury suffered by the stricken jurors. Justice Scalia
dissented from the majority's application of the third party standing of the petitioner
in light of his use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on gender. Id at
1436-37.
216. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1,
thereby requiring government entities to treat individuals who are "similarly circum-
stanced" alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). The Equal Protection Clause does not
require, however, that "things which are different in fact... be treated in law as
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are the same, and therefore interchangeable, or different; second,
whether courts should value the differences by acknowledging them.
A review of the feminist jurisprudence, sociological experiments, and
biological studies assists in answering these questions.
IV. MALE AND FEMALE JURORS ARE DISTINcr
A. Social Science Perspective
The feminist perspective was originally defined by the work of
Carol Gilligan,"' whose studies recognize striking differences be-
tween men's and women's moral analysis. According to Gilligan, wo-
men focus on context, relationships, and responsibility when resolving
moral conflicts, while men emphasize abstract justice and logical de-
ductions.2 18 Gilligan based her findings on the Rights and Responsi-
though they were the same." Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting
igner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
Historically, courts have upheld gender classifications where they found a real dif-
ference between the sexes forming the basis for the distinction. See Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-18 (1977);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-10 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-
56 (1974); Thomas Marks, Three Ring Circus: The Supreme Court Balances Interests,
18 Stetson L. Rev. 301, 341 (1989). The Court has recognized that a gender classifica-
tion based on clear differences between the sexes is not invidious. In Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), the Court upheld a gender-based classification
based on a finding that males and females were not similarly situated. The Court
reviewed legislation that distinguished male and female naval officers in which Con-
gress had provided female naval officers a longer period of time to be promoted from
lieutenant to lieutenant commander. Id. The Court found that male and female naval
officers were not "similarly situated" for purposes of promotion because, at the time,
females were not afforded the opportunity to serve in combat or in most sea duties.
Id The Court clearly based its holding on the fact that the female and male naval
officers-as groups, not individuals-were not similarly situated.
Similarly, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the Court upheld a
gender-based classification because it found there was a substantial difference be-
tween males and females. Id. at 473. The California rape law at issue in the case held
males, but not females, criminally liable for sexual intercourse with underage individ-
uals. The Court upheld the statute based on the determination that "[b]ecause virtu-
ally all of the significant harmful and inescapable identifiable consequences of
teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority
when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the conse-
quences." Id.; see also Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersection-
ality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 162 (1994).
217. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's De-
velopment (1982).
218. See generally id. (referring to a number of psychological studies which demon-
strate these distinctions). The distinction between the moral problem solving abilities
of women and men is not new to the field of human development. Even in the first
studies of human psychology, psychologists noted the difference between male and
female problem solving. Prior to Gilligan, however, this difference was defined as a
problem of female development. For a history of the use of the male norm being
applied to women, see id. at 5-23.
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bilities Study.219 In this study, she analyzed the responses of males and
females to hypothetical moral dilemmas.
An example of this basic distinction emerged in interviews 20 where
Gilligan posed a hypothetical problemP'1 to Jake, an eleven-year-old
male, and Amy, an eleven-year-old female. The problem required the
subjects to resolve "Heinz's dilemma," in which a man named Heinz
must decide whether to steal a drug that will save his wife's lifel
The subjects are told that Heinz cannot afford the drug and the drug-
gist will not reduce the price. 2 3 Jake sees a conflict between life
and property that can be resolved by logical deduction z - He ap-
proaches the problem "like a math problem with humans," setting it
up like an equation and applying logical reasoning3?6 He assumes
that since he resolved the problem logically, a judge will reach the
same conclusion if Heinz is prosecuted for stealing~tm In contrast,
Amy "considers neither property nor law, but rather the effect that
theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife."
228
Amy sees the dilemma as a "narrative of relationships that extends
over time"229 not a math problem.
A Jury of Her Peers,2 0 a short story taken from Susan Glaspell's
one-act play, also illustrates the different perspectives men and wo-
men bring to any given situation. As the story begins, the characters
proceed to the abandoned farmhouse of John Wright, a hard, cold
man, who was recently strangled in his sleep 2 2 Wright's wife, Min-
nie, has been arrested and charged with the murder2 2 Three men,
the sheriff, county attorney, and a neighbor, and two women, the
wives of the sheriff and a neighbor, examine the house in the hopes of
219. Id at 3 (emphasis omitted). Gilligan conducted three studies which involved
interviewing males and females of different ages to obtain information on their con-
ception and judgment of certain moral dilemmas. Id. at 2-3.
220. The other studies are the College Student Study and the Abortion Decision
Study. Id. In the College Student Study, Gilligan "explored [the] identity and moral
development in the early adult years." kle at 2. She interviewed twenty-five people
during their senior year of college and again five years after graduation. Id. In the
Abortion Decision Study, Gilligan studied "the relation between experience and
thought and the role of conflict in development." Id at 3. She interviewed twenty-
nine women in the first trimester of pregnancy who were contemplating abortion. ld.
221. The hypothetical was devised by Lawrence Kohlberg. Id. at 25.
222. Id.
223. IdL at 25-26.
224. Jake is determined at the outset that Heinz should steal the drug, reasoning
that "human life is worth more than money." Id. at 26.
225. I1& at 26.
226. Id. at 26-27.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 28. Amy reasons that if Heinz steals the drug he may save his wife!s life
now, but he would not be able to help her in the future if he is imprisoned. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Glaspell, supra note 1, at 124-39.




discovering the murderer's identity and motive. 3 The men conclude
there is nothing in the kitchen that points to the motive because all
they see are "kitchen things."'
As the men continue searching the house, the women remain in the
kitchen, uncovering clues to the murderer's identity and motive in the
small details framing the context of Minnie Wright's life.235 They dis-
cover a strangled bird wrapped neatly in a piece of fine silk,236 and
one woman comments that "[i]f there had been years and years of
nothing, then a bird to sing to you, it would be awful still after the bird
was stil.'' 237 The dead bird and a broken stove are symbols of John
Wright's cruelty and Minnie Wright's life without joy, symbols that
enable the women to conclude Minnie killed her husband. The men
are unable to "see" these symbols, and the women do not disclose
their findings to the men. Without the evidence discovered by the
women, Minnie cannot be charged with the crime.238
This story illustrates the different judging processes employed by
women and men.239 Studies in a variety of academic disciplines con-
cur with Glaspel's conclusions that women have a world-view signifi-
cantly different from men's.240 Psychological studies suggest that
women look at the circumstances and context of a situation, rather
than abstract principles.241
The concept of feminine reliance on context and circumstances is
further supported by empirical studies. In an experiment where boys
and girls were asked to group related objects, boys tended to group
pictures of objects with similar intrinsic characteristics. 2  Girls, on
the other hand, grouped pictures of objects based on their functional
or relational characteristics. 2 43 Boys grouped pictures of cars, trucks,
and ambulances, while girls grouped the ambulance with a doctor and
a hospital bed.24 Other studies reveal that males separate objects
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id at 130-38.
236. Id. at 136.
237. Id at 137.
238. Id. at 138.
239. Robert M. Cover et aL, Procedure 1167-68 (1988). Other commentators have
suggested that use of the message in Glaspell's story can differ. Grossman, supra note
78, at 1142 (arguing that the story captures the strategy of the fight for jury service as
being an emphasis on gender difference); Marcia Noe, Susan Glaspell: Voice from the
Heartland 33-34 (1983) (noting that the story illustrates "that the female mode of
perception... serves as a bond to unite women in sisterhood").
240. Sherry, supra, note 18, at 580.
241. See Gilligan, supra note 217, at 38.
242. Merrill B. Hintikka & Jaakko Hintikka, How Can Language Be Sexist?, in
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Method-
ology, and Philosophy of Science 139, 145-46 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka
eds., 1983) (footnote omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id at 145.
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from the background, while females see the entire picture, 45 and
males are less field-dependent and can ignore the influence of
context0-
Other researchers have discovered that women are more attuned to
other people's emotions.4 7 A recent study conducted at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania,248 found that subtle expressions of sadness, espe-
dally by women, are detected more frequently by women than men. 49
Jean Baker Miller found that women have a "much greater sense of
the emotional components of all human activity than most men. 'as°
This awareness of the emotional side of life allows women to view
facts in the context of events and the emotions attached to those
events. 5 ' This ability and awareness is valuable in society as a
whole,2- and invaluable on a jury that must judge the credibility of
parties and witnesses.
Ironically, at a time when courts are attempting to eliminate gender
considerations in the jury selection process, the differences in the
sexes are being reinforced in the areas of social science and biology.
Utilizing recent technological advancesas 3 researchers have found
that the brains of the sexes are subtly, but significantly different. 2-
Recent studies also discovered biological signs that may be consistent
245. Ia at 145-46. See Eleanor E. Maccoby, Sex Differences in the Intellectual Func-
tioning, in The Development of Sex Differences 25-55 (Eleanor E. Maccoby ed.,
1966).
246. Julia A. Sherman & Florence L Denmark, On the Psychology of Women: A
Survey of Empirical Studies 21 (1971); see Herman A. Witkin & Donald R. Good-
enough, Field Dependence and Interspousal Behavior, 84 Psychol. Bull. 661, 662
(1977) (explaining the concept of field dependence).
247. See generally Roland I. Erwin et al., Facial Emotion Discrrnination: L Task
Construction and Behavioral Findings in Normal Subjects, 42 Psychiatry Res. 231, 238
(1992) (discussing the results of a series of facial emotion discrimination tasks experi-
ments performed on males and females and concluding that there is a "sex difference
in performance that is specific to both the valence of the emotion portrayed and the
sex of facial stimuli"). This has often been seen by the dominant society as a weak-
ness. The judicial system has attempted to minimize the effects of emotionalism.
When considering jurors who must decide the credibility of witnesses, however, the




250. Jean B. Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women 39 (1986).
251. Id.
252. To value these qualities, women must be willing to risk acknowledging the
differences.
253. This advanced technology is called functional magnetic resonance imaging and
allows the brain to be photographed while the subjects are performing an assigned
task.
254. Bennett A. Shaywitz et al., Sex Differences in the Functional Organization of
the Brain for Language, 373 Nature 607 (1995); Ruben C. Gur et al, Sex Differences
in Regional Cerebral Glucose Metabolism During a Resting State, 267 ScL 528 (1995).
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with the social science discoveries. 5 Thus far, no studies have specif-
ically tested the applicability of Gilligan's theory to the jury process.
The empirical research regarding gender differences on juries has
centered on verdict outcome and participation during deliberations.2 6
Differences between male and female jurors, however, have been ver-
ified. Men, for example, are more likely to overestimate an eyewit-
ness's ability to identify a suspect.257 One commentator suggested this
difference may be due to women's tendency to view the "world from a
multiplicity of perspectives. ' '1 58
Most studies involved simulated juries; however, the studies of ac-
tual jury verdicts are inconclusive.25 9 The method of reasoning used
by the jurors in arriving at a verdict has not yet been studied. Until
jury process studies testing the theories of Gilligan and others are con-
ducted, the law and the courts should rely on the available psychologi-
cal studies which overwhelmingly indicate that men and women speak
in a different voice.
B. Feminist Perspective on Difference
The concept of difference is not foreign to feminist jurisprudence.260
Feminist thought has revolved around the debate of how to define
"woman, ' 261 therefore, the feminist movement has been consistently
255. Researchers stress caution in drawing conclusions about what the experiments
mean. "[S]cientists say nonetheless that the groundwork [is] being laid for determin-
ing what the differences really mean." Gina Kolata, Man's World, Woman's World?
Brain Studies Point to Differences, N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 28, 1995, at Cl, C7. See also Anne
Moir and David Jessel, Brain Sex, The Real Differences Between Men & Women
(1991).
256. See generally Grossman, supra note 78 (providing a sampling of the articles
regarding jury studies).
257. Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 Yale L.J. 593,
601 (1987) (citing Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 19, 26-27 (1983)).
This information would obviously be an important consideration for the attorney de-
fending a man accused of robbery where the only evidence which ties him to the
crime is the victim's identification.
258. See id. at 601 n.38.
259. See Cookie Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their
Influences on Juries' Verdicts, in The Jury System in America 97, 115 (Rita J. Simon
ed., 1975) (concluding that much of the data on the difference between male and
female jurors is contradictory and lacking).
260. Feminist jurisprudence is the "examination of the relationship between law
and society from the point of view of all women." Lynn H. Schafram, Lawyers' Lives,
Clients' Lives: Can Women Liberate the Profession?, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 1105, 1113(1989) (quoting Catherine MacKinnon, Developing Feminist Jurisprudence, Panel
Discussion at the 14th National Conference on Women and Law in Washington, D.C.(Apr. 9, 1983), quoted in Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries
of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 64, 64 (1985)).
261. Simone de Beauvoir noted that in asking the question of what is a woman, we
place ourselves in the position of being the "Other." Men, she observed, are the
masculine and the neutral, while women are the peculiar, the different. Woman is
defined in relation to man. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex at xvii-xviii (1974).
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concerned with issues of difference. 261 Should women be defined as
the same as or different from men? A review of the history of femi-
nist legal thought is essentially a study of the development of the dif-
ference principle. 63
Under the formal equality theory, feminists originally adopted the
approach that women were not different from men?34 Formal equal-
ity265 assumes that women can achieve equality by defining them-
selves as the same as men.2s1 Formal equality theorists argue that
women would act and be like men if given equal opportunities?67
Consequently, the focus is on women's similarities to men and the be-
lief that "women and men are in all important respects the same and
should be treated the same under law."'
Under the formal equality theory, women achieved several victories
in the legal arena269 and many overt forms of discrimination seemed
to disappear. Feminists soon realized, however, that formal equality
would not end subordination of women.270 Feminists discovered that
262. Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 Yale LJ. 1265,1266-67(1993) (reviewing Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 199).
263. Id. at 1266.
264. This doctrine emerged in the 1960s when women began to enter the legal com-
munity in growing numbers. Id. at 1266-67. See Feminist Legal Theory, supra note
199, at 5.
265. Dailey, supra note 262, at 1267. Other authors have named this theory differ-
ently. Mary Becker calls it "formal equality." Mary E. Becker, Strength in Diversity:
Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23
Stetson L. Rev. 701, 701 (1994). Others call it the "sameness theory" or "equality
doctrine." See John E. Morrison, Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Differ-
ence Dilemma, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 973 (1994). See also, Feminist Legal Theory, supra
note 199, at 5.
266. The early feminists' "efforts were directed at uncovering the ways in which law
discriminated against women by denying them rights accorded to men." Dailey, supra
note 262, at 1267.
267. Marcia M. Boumil & Stephen C. Hicks, Women and the Law 25 (1992).
268. Dailey, supra note 262, at 1267. What is troublesome about the sameness
model is that it defines women as the same as men-using men as the comparison
point. Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 264, at 5. As Mary Joe Frug points out,
"Although neutral in form, the equality guarantee is functionally male-biased." Frug,
supra note 18, at 42; see also Dailey, supra note 262, at 1269 (noting that to ignore
differences in the name of formal equality is to exclude women who do not fit the
universal male standard).
269. See, e.g., Wendy W. Wllams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175 (1982) (discussing formal
equality theory). The success of this method is demonstrated in three Supreme Court
cases. See -ishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
270. Many feminists continue to seek equality by defining men and women as the
same. See Williams, supra note 269. Proponents of the formal equality theory, how-
ever, point out that history demonstrates that distinctions drawn between men and
women have traditionally been be used to disadvantage women. Cipriani, supra note
200, at 1268-69. They argue that recognition of differences merely reinforces stereo-
types that have historically been used to disadvantage women. See Williams, supra
note 269, at 196-97. Additionally, they urge that this method is the only way to elimi-
nate the cultural limitations of gender. Id.
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in many cases, formal equality hurts rather than helps women.271 This
recognition led a substantial number of theorists to challenge the un-
derlying assumption of formal equality.272 These "difference" theo-
rists recognize the differences between men and women and strive to
value these differences by ensuring that women are not disadvantaged
by them.273
Robin West espouses the differences between men and women in a
theory often referred to as "relational feminism. '274 West asserts that
women and men are different "because women are actually or poten-
tially" connected physically to other human life.275 West argues that
this potential for human connection defines women.276 Relational
feminists assert that "women are more empathetic to the lives of
others because women are physically tied to the lives of others in a
way which men are not. ' 277 Relational feminists believe the legal sys-
tem should recognize and value these differences.278
While relational feminists find the essence of women's difference in
the joys of human connection, the subordination theorists279 find the
essence of difference in the "pain and deprivation of subordina-
tion."280 Catharine MacKinnon, the subordination theory's leading
supporter, seeks to redefine the issues so the discussion does not re-
volve around differences. 281 She argues that any rationalization for
differences or determination that there are differences, however rea-
sonable they may be, is part of the systematic subordination of women
to men.2 2 Although MacKinnon rejects any theory which attempts to
define the differences between men and women, her theory is none-
theless based on the "fundamental difference of women's subordina-
tion."'28 3 The source of the distinction is different, yet the essence of
271. Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201,
214-15.
272. Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selec-
tion, 2 UCLA Women's L.J. 35, 36-37 (1992).
273. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal
Educ. 3, 19-20 (1988); Littleton, supra note 16, at 1312-37.
274. This theory is also called "relational theory" or the "relational feminist." West
refers to it as "connectedness thesis." West, supra note 16, at 3.
275. Id. at 14. West discusses three experiences that connect women to others: in-
tercourse, pregnancy, and mothering. Each provides the potential to be connected to
another human life which is distinct from the way men are physically connected. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id at 16.
278. Id. at 18.
279. This theory is usually called the dominance theory. However, for purposes of
symmetry, I chose to focus on women's characteristics in describing each of these
theories.
280. Dailey, supra note 262, at 1271.
281. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 32-45 (1987).
282. Id.; see also Becker, supra note 271, at 229 (referring to Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 116-17 (1979)).
283. Dailey, supra note 262, at 1269.
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subordination theory is that men and women are different324 Central
to both the relational theory and the subordination theory is the claim
that women have a unique viewpoint and experience.285
The most recent feminist theory is "postmodern feminism."
Postmodernists recognize the variety of perspectives among women2"
and acknowledge the existence of basic core issues and experiences of
women.2 7 The postmodern feminist develops generalizations about
women based on their experiences, rather than "universal truths." s
These feminists recognize that acknowledging and using "women's
lived experiences ... can 'deploy the commonalities among real wo-
men' and 'at the same time challenge the conventional meanings of
"woman" that sustain the subordinating conditions of women's
lives.' ,,289
The source of the female perspective has been debated for centu-
ries. Some point to biological differences,290 while others argue that
women are innately connected to others by their ability to have chil-
dren and, therefore, reason differently then men.291 Some attribute
the creation of the feminine perspective to society. This last group
284. Id. (noting that "for MacKinnon the only real difference-the only difference
that matters-is that women are oppressed and men are their oppressors").
285. Id. at 1270.
286. Martha Minow espouses the idea that each individual must be looked at from
her personal perspective. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It,
in Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 199, at 357. This theory requires sensitivity to a
wide variety of differences beyond gender. Dailey, supra note 262, at 1272. Many
have come to believe that "the female subject, has no core identity but rather is con-
stituted through multiple structures and discourses that in various ways overlap, inter-
sect, and contradict each other." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 829, 877 (1990).
287. Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor
Mary Joe Frug, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1084, 1085 (1992). Professor Colker recognizes that
the anti-essentialism perspective does not make it impossible to generalize about wo-
men. Id However, she warns that feminists must be cautious about generalizations.
Id.
288. Marion Smiley, Gender Justice Without Foundations, 89 Mich. L Rev. 1574,
1576 (1991).
289. Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe
Frug, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1096, 1099 (1992) (quoting Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern
Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 Harv. L Rev. 1045,1059 (1992)).
290. Mary Joe Frug observed that "[m]ost feminists are committed to the position
that however 'natural' and common sex differences may seem, the differences be-
tween women and men are not biologically compelled; they are, rather, 'socially con-
structed.' Frug, supra note 289, at 1048. She concludes, however, that the source of
these differences is irrelevant to the importance of these differences in today's society.
See id.
Recently, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, articu-
lated his own theories as to the biological differences between men and women. He
observed that men are "biologically driven to go out and hunt giraffes" and that wo-
men are incapable of surviving in combat because they cannot stay in a fox hole for
thirty days because of "infections." Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post,
Jan. 18, 1995, at B3.
291. See West, supra note 16.
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asserts that, because of a woman's historical role in society, she is
forced to depend on men and must accordingly develop "fluid ego
boundaries."2" The source of this perspective, however, is irrelevant
to the practicing attorney faced with the awesome duty of selecting
the best jury for his or her client.
If women speak in a "different voice" and bring a distinct vision to
moral dilemmas, courts should expect women to bring a different per-
spective to the process of judging cases as jurors.293 Social science and
feminist theories of difference suggest that viewing gender as com-
pletely irrelevant to the jury process disregards the significant com-
plexity of jury selection.
V. J.E.B. FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE GENDER PLAYS IN
JURY SELECTION
A. Gender Differences Affect Jury Selection
If there is a gender dichotomy regarding moral analysis, the "impli-
cations for jury selection are obvious. "294 Women's viewpoint of con-
nectedness is a factor that attorneys should be permitted to consider.
If they determine that this perspective is beneficial to the client, attor-
neys should be permitted to exercise a peremptory challenge based on
that determination. From a practical standpoint, there are numerous
considerations to make in determining whether to use a peremptory
challenge. As Professor Pizzi indicates, what really happens with per-
emptory challenges is comparison shopping during which litigants at-
tempt to determine which jurors are more sympathetic to their case.29
It is no wonder that the effective use of peremptory challenges has
been described as "art, as science, and as [a] guessing game." '2 9 6 Com-
munication is a gestalt process, that is, the sum of all of the parts or
the sum of each part does not equal the total.297 The same is true of
jury selection.
As in all areas of trial advocacy, jury selection has become more
refined throughout the years.298 Many broad generalizations that
292. Sherry, supra note 18, at 585 n.177. Rather than being separate from others,
women tend to view others as an extension of themselves-as connected to others.
Id.; see also Miller, supra note 250, at 71-73; Nancy Chadorow, The Reproduction of
Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology Of Gender 67-99 (1978).
293. Forman, supra note 272, at 50.
294. Id.
295. Pizzi, supra note 37, at 126.
296. Eugene I. Pavalon, Jury Selection Theories: Art? Science? Guessing Game?, 23
Trial, June 1987, at 26.
297. James Rasicot, Jury Selection, Body Language & The Visual Trial 4 (1983).
298. "[Jury selection] experts view the old folklore about desirable and undesirable
jurors as too crude and unsophisticated." Pizzi, supra note 37, at 132. The field of
"jury science" is catching the attention of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. Some
lament that this science has the potential to "undermine some of the fundamental
values" of our jury system because the jury of the future may be highly susceptible to
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were once used to determine the best juror are now more narrowly
tailored.2 99 Library shelves are bursting with jury manuals- 0 sug-
gesting the characteristics lawyers should consider in exercising per-
emptory challenges. A competent attorney does not rely on blanket
exclusions or inclusions of female jurors.301 Rather, in selecting a jury,
the attorney must consider all the facts and subtle nuances of the
case and the potential jurors.
manipulation. Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury is Still Out. The Role of Jury Science
in the Modern American Courtroom, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1225, 1251 (1994).
The jury consultant is clearly the newest member of the litigation team. If the pol-
icy reason behind the cases limiting the peremptory challenge is a belief that individu-
als cannot be judged as a group, but must be judged individually, then any tool which
enables attorneys to ascertain the characteristics of jurors based on the limited infor-
mation available should be heralded, not discouraged.
In addition to the use of consultants, jury science also attempts to identify success-
ful trial strategies. Surrogate juries and focus groups are utilized to evaluate the attor-
neys and arguments. Surrogate juries actually listen to evidence and then deliberate
on the facts. Immediately after the deliberation, the jurors are interviewed concern-
ing their reactions to the evidence and attorneys. The survey results are used to eval-
uate the case. See generally Walter F. Abbott, Surrogate Juries 3-10 (1990) (describing
the use of surrogate juries).
Focus groups differ from surrogate juries in that the evidence is presented in a reac-
tive group setting which enables the attorney to listen to the information that is im-
portant to the group in the deliberation process. See Harvey A. Moore & Jennifer
Friedman, Courtroom Observation and Applied Litigation Research: A Case History
of Jury Decision Making, 11 Clinical Soc. Rev. 123 (1993).
299. One author suggests that the juror's favorite color will determine the juror's
conviction rate and encourages the use of color psychology during jury selection to
predict favorable or unfavorable jurors. Rasicot, supra note 297, at 98-99.
300. For a sample of the manuals see Cathy E. Bennett & Robert B. Hirschhorn,
Bennett's Guide to Jury Selection and Trial Dynamics in Civil and Criminal Litigation(1993); Jeffrey L. Kestler, Questioning Techniques and Tactics (2d ed. 1992); Bill Col-
son et al., Jury Selection: Strategy & Science (1986).
301. See Stephen Saltburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md.. L. Rev. 337, 385 (1982).
302. The factors to be considered include the sex of the juror and the sex of the
attorney. See Nora K. Villemur & Janet S. Hyde, Effects of Sex of Defense Attorney,
Sex of Juror, and Age and Attractiveness of the Victim on Mock Juror Decision Making
in a Rape Case, 9 Sex Roles 879 (1983).
In a recent California case, Eric and Lyle Menendez were charged with the first
degree murder of their parents. See Maura Dolan, Jury is Out on the Role of Gender,
L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al. The brothers claimed they were abused by their
parents and the only way they could end the abuse was to kill their parents. Id. The
fact that their parents were merely eating ice cream at the time they were shot did not
deter the defendants from asserting a self-defense claim. Id. They were tried sepa-
rately. Id. The jury who heard Eric Menendez's case split along gender lines: the six
male jurors voted for first or second degree murder, the six female jurors voted for
lesser offenses. Id. Some analysts felt the actions of the defense attorneys, both wo-
men, affected the jury. Id. at A14. One source stated that Eric Menendez's female
defense attorney was very maternal toward her client and this may have negatively
influenced the male jurors. Id.
Experienced attorneys are aware of their effect on certain kinds of jurors, including
the gender with which they are most likely to "connect." Nonetheless, under J.E.B.,
an attorney is not permitted to consider gender in selecting a juror. As Justice Scalia
hypothesizes in his dissent:
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The attorney defending a battered woman must consider the type of
abuse the defendant endured prior to killing her husband.30 3 The at-
torney seeks jurors who can see the case from the abused woman's
perspective and consider all the circumstances, not just abstract princi-
ples. The attorney must also consider if the individual juror herself is,
or has been, part of an abusive relationship and how she dealt with
that relationship.3 4 All these factors are inextricably linked to, and
cannot be separated from, the juror's gender.
Similarly, the attorney presenting a sexual harassment case must
consider whether the harassment involved coercive demands for sex-
ual intercourse, casual touching, or verbal abuse. Although males and
females are apt to agree on the existence of sexual harassment in the
former scenario, men are less likely to view the acts in the latter situa-
tion as sexual harassment.0 5 Men and women simply view the types
of harassment differently.30 6 A litigant must consider the type of har-
assment in conjunction with the juror's gender and any additional in-
formation available.
Ultimately, the juror's perspective is relevant to the attorney's deci-
sion. An attorney cannot expect to "draw[ ] ... jurors who have no
opinions that they will bring to bear on the evidence or on what hap-
pens in the courtroom and jury room. All people, [including those on
jury duty], have biases and opinions that will inevitably influence their
decisions and perceptions...." The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that "[j]urors are not expected to come into the jury box, and
[T]he prosecutor presumably violates the Constitution when he selects a
male or female police officer to testify because he believes one or the other
sex might be more convincing in the context of the particular case, or be-
cause he believes one or the other might be more appealing to a predomi-
nantly male or female jury.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The question then becomes whether
the age-old strategy of public defenders selecting a female lawyer to defend a brutal
rapist will withstand the equal protection requirements of J.E.B.
303. If the abuse was more physical then emotional, a male juror may be able to
better understand and agree with the killing of the husband. If the abuse was emo-
tional, however, involving intimidation or humiliation, a female juror is more likely to
understand the defendant's feelings. This idea was developed through discussions
with Lloyd King, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of Flor-
ida and a veteran state prosecutor. The distinction reflects women's position in soci-
ety and the fact that they are subordinated. As a group, women can better
understand the feeling of total subordination.
304. For example, if the juror herself was able to escape a battering relationship
without killing her batterer, she may be less sympathetic to the defendant. Lois He-
aney, a trial consultant in California, observed that "[iun some ways, the dangerous
person is the person who says 'I was abused, but I am fine' .... People tend to judge
people like themselves harshly." See Dolan, supra note 302, at A14.
305. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1206 (1989).
306. Id.
307. Babcock, supra note 32, at 551.
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leave behind all that their human experience has taught them."3083
Nor do we want jurors who "strip[ ] down like a runner" and "shed
the baggage of ideology."'3° The jurors' prejudice must be excluded,
not their perception.1
The idea of a "feminine" perspective has been recognized by courts
in other areas.31 In EIlison v. Brady,312 the Ninth Circuit recognized
this unique perspective and adopted a "reasonable woman" standard
for evaluating "hostile environment" in sexual harassment cases. The
court observed that "there is a broad range of viewpoints among wo-
men as a group, but [it] believe[d] that many women share common
concerns which men do not necessarily share." 313 The court con-
cluded that "[m]en, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social
setting or the underlying threat of violence that a women may per-
ceive.1314 It is evident that the court echoed the general sentiment
that women perceive events in distinctly different ways than men.
Finally, an attorney must always consider the leadership qualities of
individual jurors.315 Because jury deliberations are a group exercise,
an attorney must consider the group as a whole and determine which
individuals will act as leaders or followers.316 An attorney must avoid
wasting peremptory challenges on followers in order to preserve a suf-
ficient number of strikes to challenge questionable leaders.317 There-
fore, an attorney considers both the gender and the leadership factors
in exercising a peremptory challenge. If an attorney wants individuals
who are more likely to view the case in the context of all the circum-
stances (women), but there are several men who appear from voir dire
to be followers, the attorney may choose not to strike those men be-
cause they would likely follow the female jurors' viewpoints. In order
to zealously represent the client,318 an attorney should be permitted to
308. 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 642 (1980)).
309. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience
Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Win. & Mary L Rev. 1201,1201 (1992).
310. See generally id. (arguing that judges and jurors can remain impartial without
completely abandoning their life's experiences).
311. For a survey of other courts who have adopted the feminine perspective, see
Robert S. Adler and Ellen R. Peirce, The Lega4 Ethical, and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 Fordham L Rev. 773
(1993); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in
the Law of Self-Defense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 623, 630-38 (1980).
312. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
313. Id. at 879.
314. Id.
315. See Bennett & Irschhorn, supra note 300, at 280-309.
316. Id. at 314-17; see also Tracy L. Treggar, Note, One Jury Indivisible: A Group
Dynamics Approach to Voir Dire, 68 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 549 (1992).
317. Bennett & Hirschhorn, supra note 300, at 319.
318. See supra note 5 (describing a lawyer's duty to the client according to the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
consider this information, act accordingly, and not be required to jus-
tify the exclusion of a juror on purely gender-neutral grounds.319
Common sense and empirical data suggest that people cannot and
do not ignore gender in dealing with other individuals.3 0 J.E.B., how-
ever, requires prosecutors to ignore gender in dealing with jurors.
People do not ignore gender in choosing companions, and should not
be expected to ignore it in selecting those who will make the most
important decision in their life-one involving their freedom. 321
When an attorney selects jurors based on an assessment of their rea-
soning styles, this selection does not perpetuate "invidious"
stereotypes.
The Court in J.E.B. failed to recognize the real differences between
male and female jurors. It elevated the rights of jurors over the rights
of the litigant to determine who sits on the jury. The basis of this
decision was a desire to purge the system of "invidious" stereotyp-
ing.3 1 Unfortunately, the Court sacrificed common sense in exchange
for aspirational goals.
The J.E.B. decision should be limited to those challenges which are
based solely on gender. Peremptory challenges based on gender plus
an additional factor were not addressed in J.E.B. There is support,
however, for the argument that if a non-gender-based reason for a
strike is coupled with a gender-based reason, the strike may be per-
mitted. The J.E.B. Court stated that its "conclusion that litigants may
not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply
the elimination of all peremptory challenges. '' 3 3 The Court's use of
the word "solely" may have signaled its willingness to distinguish
those challenges based entirely on gender and those challenges in
which gender is merely a factor.324
319. In addition to leadership, the juror's individual characteristics intersect with
gender in several areas. For example, the juror's gender may affect the way a litigant
views the juror in light of his occupation. Individuals who are employed in jobs which
have traditionally been undertaken by the opposite sex may have a perspective that is
relevant to their selection as jurors. A litigant may determine that a female construc-
tion worker is less likely to understand his client's perspective in a sexual harassment
case due to her involvement in a male-dominated workplace. A strike of the juror is
not based on the fact that she is a construction worker, because a male construction
worker would not necessarily be struck. Rather, it is the combination of the juror's
occupation and gender that forms the basis for the peremptory strike. Under a strict
reading of J.E.B. v. Alabama, however, such a strike is prohibited.
320. Becker, supra note 271, at 209.
321. A colleague reminded me of a popular "Saturday Night Live" skit in which an
androgynous individual named Pat baffles all of its co-workers by confusing them as
to its gender. The skit revolves around the attempts of others to determine Pat's sex,
in order to know how to respond to him/her.
322. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994).
323. 1& (emphasis added).
324. See Holder v. Welborn, 60 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding a prosecutor's
peremptory challenge which was not based solely on race but a combination of race
plus case specific race-neutral factors). But see Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 28
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Under race-based equal protection, outside of the area of peremp-
tory challenges, the Court has undertaken a "mixed motive analy-
sis"'  in instances where the party's actions are based on a
combination of permissible and impermissible factors. The Court has
not addressed the application of the mixed motive analysis to peremp-
tory challenges. 3 Peremptory challenges jurisprudence, however, is
an area where the courts should distinguish race and gender and not
require a "mixed motive analysis. '3 7 Here, the Court should ac-
knowledge the difference between male and female jurors and find
that if the gender of the juror is only one factor in the strike, the strike
survives under the intermediate scrutiny test.3m This limitation on
J.E.B. is justified by the finding that male and female jurors are differ-
ent. The reasoning process of a juror is of legitimate concern to a
litigant. The voir dire process is ill-equipped to determine characteris-
tics that are still being studied in controlled experiments. Therefore,
the litigant should be allowed to use gender as a factor in the peremp-
tory challenge equation.
B. Who is Hurt by the Use of Gender As a Factor in
Peremptory Challenges?
Who is hurt by the use of gender as a factor in peremptory chal-
lenges? In J.E.B., the Court held that "[d]iscrimination in jury selec-
tion, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants,
the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded
from participation in the judicial process."329 JE.B. found that liti-
(2d Cir. 1993) (noting the dangers of basing a theory of equal protection on one
word).
325. In employment discrimination cases, the Court has recognized a defense to
liability if the defendant can show that although there were impermissible factors, the
challenged action would have occurred even absent the improper consideration.
Under this analysis, however, the disputed action violates the Equal Protection
Clause if it would not have occurred "but for" the impermissible factor. Mt. Healthy
City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,285-87 (1977). Under a "gender plus analysis"
the action of striking a juror would not violate the Equal Protection Clause even if
gender was a factor as long as it was not the only factor in the challenge.
326. See Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924,926 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the "mixed motive analysis" is inappropriate in the context of a Batson
inquiry because of the difficulty in separating permissible and impermissible motiva-
tions in jury selection).
327. As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledges in his dissenting opinion in J.E.B.,
"In balancing the dictates of equal protection and the historical practice of peremp-
tory challenges, long recognized as securing fairness in trials, the Court [in Batson]
concluded that the command of the Equal Protection Clause was superior." 114 S. Ct.
at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Due to the difference in the level of scrutiny in
the area of gender-based peremptory challenges, however, the balance may shift the
other way. See id
328. Rehnquist stated in his dissenting opinion in J.E.B., the fact that "race and sex
discrimination are different is acknowledged by our equal protection jurisprudence,
which accords different levels of protection to the two groups." Id
329. Id at 1427.
1995) 529
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
gants were hurt because the discrimination motivating the jury selec-
tion procedure could infect the whole system.330 Litigants are not
hurt, however, when they are using their peremptory challenges in a
way they believe necessary to obtain a fair jury. The appearance of
justice has been said to be as important as the reality of justice.331
Additionally, under J.E.B., the legal system takes one more step
toward the elimination of peremptory challenges. The litigants are lit-
tle served by the elimination of "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused. '332 There is no substitution for the per-
emptory challenge. Although voir dire may be expanded as a conse-
quence of this decision, it cannot replace the peremptory challenge
because the ways of thinking that sociologists have identified are not
easily ascertained without the use of controlled empirical tests.
The differences between men and women are not merely a group
bias,333 but are fundamental to the genders and at the heart of what
make males "male" and females "female." The difference is in the
way the genders solve problems and view the world-differences that
a two-minute voir dire will not reveal.334 The harm to litigants in
slowly eradicating the peremptory challenge is more harmful than a
general suspicion that the entire trial will be infected by the idea that
men and women are different.
Additionally, by eliminating the peremptory challenge, the Court is
slowly seizing the power of jury selection from the litigants. In dis-
cussing the importance of jury trials, Justice White recognizes that
"[p]roviding an accused the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
[gives] him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge." '335 The same can be said of the peremptory challenge. Its
elimination will place jury selection in the hands of a trial judge apply-
ing sometimes vague or broad definitions of "challenge for cause."
The parties will lose and so will the public.
330. Id.
331. In J.E.B., Justice Scalia recognized the appearance of impartiality as an impor-
tant goal of peremptory challenges:
[T]he appearance of justice is as important as its reality. If the system of
peremptory strikes affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but
gives litigants a greater belief in that impartiality, it serves a most important
function. In point of fact, that may well be its greater value.
Id. at 1438 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
332. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
333. See Pizzi, supra note 37, at 129-30 (discussing the group bias studies).
334. According to the Court:
Voir dire... cannot fill the gap. The biases that go along with group charac-
teristics tend to be biases that the juror himself does not perceive, so that it
is no use asking about them. It is fruitless to inquire of a male juror whether
he harbors any subliminal prejudice in favor of unwed fathers.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438-39.
335. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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In J.E.B., the Court was concerned that the public vill lose confi-
dence in a system where the state participates "in the perpetuation of
invidious group stereotypes. '" 33 6 The Court's reasoning is circuitous.
The Court finds that a "verdict will not be accepted or understood [as
fair] if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset."33 7 Yet, the
use of gender-based peremptory challenges is only unlawful if the
Court determines that the practice violates the Constitution. There-
fore, the public will not lose faith in the jury system unless the Court
holds that gender challenges are unlawful.
The community is harmed when it loses confidence in the system
and the question becomes whether the public will remain confident in
a dishonest system. Although J.E.B. prohibits the use of gender-
based peremptory challenges, it does not prohibit peremptory chal-
lenges that are "disproportionately associated with one gender."33 s
Additionally, the explanations the litigants are required to put forth
can further undermine the public's confidence in the system. 39 The
community is far more likely to accept that the litigants perceive a
difference in men and women and are acting on that belief. Since the
community at large accepts that these gender differences exist, °0 the
Court should also.
The Court strives to purge the system of "invidious" stereotyping at
the expense of common sense. It describes gender stereotyping as im-
permissible. If women do reason differently, however, as the psycho-
logical and biological studies demonstrate, this should not be
impermissible stereotyping. Apparently stereotyping is impermissible
only if it is "invidious." Yet the difference in reasoning is only invidi-
ous if society values one type of reasoning while devaluing another.
The denial of difference essentially belittles the difference. Society
must not be afraid to acknowledge proven differences simply because
people may devalue those differences.
Finally, the Court is concerned that "[s]triking individual jurors on
the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their
gender is 'practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion
of their inferiority.' "I The majority in J.E.B. indicates that gender-
based peremptory challenges are degrading to women." 2 Unfortu-
nately, the Court misconstrues the role of the peremptory challenge.
The peremptory challenge is not a determination of qualification, but
336. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
337. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,413 (1991)) (alteration in original).
338. Id. at 1429.
339. See Michael Raphael & Edward I. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Ex-
planations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. Mich. J.L ReL 229 (1993) (discussing the
full range of possible neutral explanations for striking a particular juror).
340. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.





a determination of preference. The system degrades jurors when it
assumes they are not intelligent enough to understand the difference
between men and women and recognize that litigants are acting on
that reality. 3 As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissenting opin-
ion in J.E.B., "The two sexes differ, both biologically and, to a dimin-
ishing extent, in experience. It is not merely 'stereotyping' to say that
these differences may produce a difference in outlook which is
brought to the jury room."3" This is different than the derogatory
and invidious stereotyping that was directed at black jurors.345
Ultimately, the effect of this decision must be assessed in terms of
the cost to female litigants and victims. Justice O'Connor, in her con-
curring opinion in J.E.B., recognized the effect of this decision on fe-
male defendants. She questioned the rightness of prohibiting a
battered woman on trial for murdering her batterer from attempting
to obtain as many female jurors as possible. 46 The female victim
faced with explaining her version of the truth must overcome many
obstacles due to the constraints of a male defined system. J.E.B. does
not protect her rights; on the contrary it eliminates them.
One article 347 has suggested that an attorney, faced with the awe-
some task of selecting a jury for the battered woman described in the
introduction to this Article, has various alternatives: (1) conclude that
because the challenge is based in part on gender, the attorney must
decline to exercise her peremptory strikes, thereby not selecting a jury
she believes to be the best for her client;3 s (2) employ a "mental
quota system," striking one woman for every man to avoid the ap-
pearance of gender-based discrimination; 349 or (3) attempt to explain
343. See Alschuler, supra note 44, at 161-63 (noting that the system treats jurors
like children, and not very bright ones at that).
344. 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
345. Id.
346. Justice O'Connor inquires, "Will we, in the name of fighting gender discrimi-
nation, hold that the battered wife-on trial for wounding her abusive husband-is a
state actor? Will we preclude her from using her peremptory challenges to ensure
that the jury of her peers contains as many women members as possible?" Id. at 1433(O'Connor, J., concurring). She suggests the limiting of the majority opinion in J.E.B.
to the prosecution only. Id Such a solution, however, would tip the scales toward the
defense. It also fails to recognize the State's need to determine whether certain rea-
soning would be desirable.
347. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 901 n.179 (1994).
348. Id. This is an occasion when an attorney's duty to zealously represent his or
her client is limited by the laws which provide that the rights of a third party super-
sede the rights of the defendant.
349. Id. This may not be feasible because courts do not require multiple strikes to
find discrimination. The majority in J.E.B. stated that "[t]he exclusion of even onejuror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in
the fairness of the system." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.13. Also, because the right at
stake rests in the individual juror, even one strike could be challenged.
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her strikes on a basis other than gender. 350 None of these alternatives
further the selection of an impartial jury. Nor do they further the
rights of the individual litigants. The only accomplishment is a so-
called "landmark decision for women's rights. '' as1 Quite simply, the
costs are too high.
CONCLUSION
The case law and constitutional principles espoused in Batson and
J.E.B. do not warrant the conclusion that gender should be prohibited
as a basis for peremptory challenges. 5 Under the equal protection
doctrine, the courts are not required to disregard the difference be-
tween the genders. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized in
her concurring opinion in J.E.B., the principle underlying J.E.B. is
more a policy as a matter of law rather than a reflection of the real
world.353 In the real world,354 women and men react differently, rea-
son differently, and think differently.55 This belief is supported by
scientific and sociological research.356
A defendant's position will not be understood if jurors are unable to
relate to his or her perspective. An attorney may legitimately believe
that a woman or a man would be better able to understand the argu-
ment being presented. The courts should not sacrifice the litigants'
right to select the jurors who will decide their fate merely to promote
a broader interest regarding discrimination.3-7 To demand genuine
gender neutrality or "dryness," as the U.S. Supreme Court apparently
350. Id. The Supreme Court permits stereotypes if the classification is not subject
to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny. See id. at 1430. Also, the use of group-based
peremptory challenges is acceptable even if it may have a disparate impact on women
or men. fI at 1429 n.16.
351. See Savage, supra note 16, at A9 (quoting the National Women's Law Center
regarding the J.E.B. decision).
352. See Forman, supra note 272, at 37.
353. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
354. "The institutional context within which a feminist must practice law creates a
tension between the immediate interest of her clients and the broader interest of wo-
men, generally." Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 199, at 3; see Coughlin, supra note
3, at 3.
355. Some may argue that by holding that gender can be used because of perceived
differences, race should also be useable based on perceived differences. Race, how-
ever, is distinguishable from gender in several important ways. First, race has been
treated differently from a strict scrutiny standpoint throughout its equal protection
history. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Additionally, an-
other distinction between race and gender is the desirability of a world where a dis-
tinction between the sexes exists. As Mary Becker said "[w]ith race, we can at least
imagine a world in which ... race is no more important than eye color.... Most of us
would not want to live in a world in which sex was no more important or relevant than
eye color." Becker, supra note 271, at 234.
356. See supra part IV.
357. As Justice Scalia observed in his dissenting opinion, "unisex is unquestionably
in fashion." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436.
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does, is to demand the impossible.3 58 "[V]iewing gender as com-
pletely irrelevant to the jury process may obscure [the] significant
complexity [of the jury selection process] and thus lead to inappropri-
ate policy responses. 359
358. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 347, at 901.
359. Forrnan, supra note 272, at 51.
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